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Malware3 associated actors

DOORME

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injection
Platforms
Windows

DoorMe is a Windows backdoor implemented as a malicious native C++ module for Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS). It provides covert remote access to compromised web servers, including Microsoft Exchange servers, by intercepting incoming HTTP requests before normal IIS processing. The module remains passive until a request supplies a specific authentication value in an HTTP cookie. Authenticated GET requests can return the host's username and hostname, while POST requests carry AES-encrypted commands encoded with a customized Base64 alphabet.

DoorMe supports generating an identifier for an infected system, receiving and reassembling shellcode in chunks, and executing shellcode in memory within its hosting process. It communicates with executing shellcode through named pipes to deliver input and retrieve output. Its anti-analysis features include XOR-obfuscated strings, control-flow flattening, anti-disassembly techniques, and runtime API resolution. Loading within IIS provides an embedded foothold in the web-server infrastructure rather than relying on a standalone executable.

DoorMe has been used by ChamelGang and in activity tracked as REF2924. ChamelGang deployed a modified DoorMe v2 on Exchange servers at a Russian aviation organization after exploiting the ProxyShell vulnerability chain, comprising CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207. Other observed deployments affected the foreign ministry of an ASEAN member state and a telecommunications provider in Afghanistan. These deployments place DoorMe in operations targeting aviation, government, diplomatic, and telecommunications environments.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Chamelgang

Attackers then installed a modified version of the backdoor DoorMe v2 on two Microsoft Exchange mail servers on the victim’s network.

via threatpostthreatpost.com
APT41

DOORME is a native backdoor module that is loaded into a victim's IIS infrastructure and used to provide remote access to the target infrastructure.

via elastic security labselastic.co
REF2924

The deployment method for malicious IIS modules like DOORME can be found in a referenced blog post.

via elastic security labselastic.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence2

Command ID 0x43... allows the attacker to execute shellcode in the memory of the same process... utilizing the Windows native functions NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx.

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence1

The attacker can send input to the shellcode and retrieve its output via a named pipe.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence2

DOORME is a native backdoor module that is loaded into a victim's IIS infrastructure and used to provide remote access to the target infrastructure.

T1505.004IIS ComponentsEvidence1

Malicious IIS modules based on the DoorMe IIS backdoor were loaded through the iissvcs service.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Command ID 0x43... allows the attacker to execute shellcode in the memory of the same process.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

DOORME XOR-encrypts strings to evade detection... The malware also employs... Control Flow Obfuscation (CFO) to complicate the analysis of its behavior.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence2

DOORME first resolves the address of LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress Windows API by parsing the kernel32.dll module export table.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Command ID 0x43... allows the attacker to execute shellcode in the memory of the same process.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The REF2924 intrusion set, using SIESTAGRAPH, DOORME, SHADOWPAD, and the system binary proxy execution technique (among others) represents an attack group...

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The IIS backdoor monitored incoming HTTP requests and accepted commands through POST requests; SiestaGraph used Microsoft Graph API C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

U - Download from OneDrive... the file is downloaded from OneDrive by the implant, but uploaded by the attacker.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

The malware's implementation of Base64 uses a different index table compared to the default Base64 encoding RFC.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Commands are AES-encrypted and then Base64 encoded, which the DOORME backdoor then decrypts.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.