MalwareUsed by 2 actors

NitroGem

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Contagious Interview

NitroGem — Trojan in a Fake Web3 Job-Interview Repo (IOC Reference) ... Family: Developer-targeted trojan (npm prepare lifecycle abuse + Google Doc C2 indirection + arbitrary RCE) ... NitroGem presents itself as a React + web3 dApp.

via github gist webgist.github.com

TraderTraitor

via github gist webgist.github.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

After 2–3 friendly exchanges, the recruiter sends "please review the codebase before our technical interview." Calendly link, often on a fresh subdomain.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The C2 response body is compiled with new (Function.constructor)("require", responseData) and executed as executor(require) — arbitrary attacker-supplied JavaScript runs with full require capability.

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Hidden in app/controllers/frontController.js is a five-stage trojan that fires automatically when a developer runs npm install : npm install triggers the prepare lifecycle script.

Stealth

3 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

NitroGem presents itself as a React + web3 dApp... The malicious pair is named to read as innocuous admin utilities ( setApiKey , verify )... Each name describes a benign operation the function doesn't actually perform.

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Hidden in app/controllers/frontController.js is a five-stage trojan that fires automatically when a developer runs npm install : npm install triggers the prepare lifecycle script.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

check-environment.js — anti-analysis env filter (refuses Gitpod/Codespaces/VS-Code-on-Win11)... Practical effect is anti-analysis filtering — those are environments security researchers most often use to safely poke at unknown repos.

Discovery

1 technique

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The C2 response body is compiled with new (Function.constructor)("require", responseData) and executed as executor(require).

T1568.003DNS CalculationEvidence1

Top-level code in frontController.js (line 605) fetches a public Google Doc. The doc body is base64-decoded into a C2 URL... Final C2 rotates — controlled by editing the Google Doc.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The doc body is base64-decoded into a C2 URL; the victim's full process.env is POSTed to it (header x-secret-header: secret ).

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

1 SOURCESView more in app

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 2 actors

NitroGem

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Contagious Interview

via github gist webgist.github.com

TraderTraitor

via github gist webgist.github.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

After 2–3 friendly exchanges, the recruiter sends "please review the codebase before our technical interview." Calendly link, often on a fresh subdomain.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Hidden in app/controllers/frontController.js is a five-stage trojan that fires automatically when a developer runs npm install : npm install triggers the prepare lifecycle script.

Stealth

3 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Hidden in app/controllers/frontController.js is a five-stage trojan that fires automatically when a developer runs npm install : npm install triggers the prepare lifecycle script.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Discovery

1 technique

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The C2 response body is compiled with new (Function.constructor)("require", responseData) and executed as executor(require).

T1568.003DNS CalculationEvidence1

Top-level code in frontController.js (line 605) fetches a public Google Doc. The doc body is base64-decoded into a C2 URL... Final C2 rotates — controlled by editing the Google Doc.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The doc body is base64-decoded into a C2 URL; the victim's full process.env is POSTed to it (header x-secret-header: secret ).

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

1 SOURCESView more in app

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.