Rust clipboard hijacker
Techniques & procedures
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
A WordPress phishing site serves as the main landing page, while GitHub and SourceForge projects are used to host and distribute the files.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
The victim needs to trigger SniperBot_Premium(Free).exe (or other related name depending on the “solution” promoted). This file is a simple .NET loader which executes the file located in src/config/silkebin.exe.
When it detects a supported address format, it replaces the clipboard contents with an attacker-controlled wallet address taken from an internal list.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
To maintain persistence, the malware writes a shell script wrapper to ~/launch.sh and installs a RunAtLoad and KeepAlive LaunchAgent plist at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.example..plist , causing launchd to silently re-execute the binary on every login and restart it if it dies.
The sample achieves persistence by copying itself to %APPDATA%\\silke\\silke.exe and creating a shortcut in the Startup folder so it will automatically run at logon.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
To maintain persistence, the malware writes a shell script wrapper to ~/launch.sh and installs a RunAtLoad and KeepAlive LaunchAgent plist at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.example..plist , causing launchd to silently re-execute the binary on every login and restart it if it dies.
The sample achieves persistence by copying itself to %APPDATA%\\silke\\silke.exe and creating a shortcut in the Startup folder so it will automatically run at logon.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
This phishing website promotes a mix of “edge” tools that all promise easy, unfair advantages.
The malware creates a hidden window and registers as a clipboard listener using Windows APIs such as AddClipboardFormatListener , OpenClipboard , GetClipboardData , EmptyClipboard , and SetClipboardData.
When it detects a supported address format, it replaces the clipboard contents with an attacker-controlled wallet address taken from an internal list.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
These binaries install persistence, continuously monitor the clipboard for strings that look like cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and replace them with attacker-controlled wallets from large, embedded lists.
Observables
15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this malware family.