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Mallory
Malware

Rust clipboard hijacker

Tracked since Jun 17, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs15Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence2

A WordPress phishing site serves as the main landing page, while GitHub and SourceForge projects are used to host and distribute the files.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The victim needs to trigger SniperBot_Premium(Free).exe (or other related name depending on the “solution” promoted). This file is a simple .NET loader which executes the file located in src/config/silkebin.exe.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

When it detects a supported address format, it replaces the clipboard contents with an attacker-controlled wallet address taken from an internal list.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

To maintain persistence, the malware writes a shell script wrapper to ~/launch.sh and installs a RunAtLoad and KeepAlive LaunchAgent plist at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.example..plist , causing launchd to silently re-execute the binary on every login and restart it if it dies.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The sample achieves persistence by copying itself to %APPDATA%\\silke\\silke.exe and creating a shortcut in the Startup folder so it will automatically run at logon.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

To maintain persistence, the malware writes a shell script wrapper to ~/launch.sh and installs a RunAtLoad and KeepAlive LaunchAgent plist at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.example..plist , causing launchd to silently re-execute the binary on every login and restart it if it dies.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The sample achieves persistence by copying itself to %APPDATA%\\silke\\silke.exe and creating a shortcut in the Startup folder so it will automatically run at logon.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

This phishing website promotes a mix of “edge” tools that all promise easy, unfair advantages.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The malware creates a hidden window and registers as a clipboard listener using Windows APIs such as AddClipboardFormatListener , OpenClipboard , GetClipboardData , EmptyClipboard , and SetClipboardData.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

When it detects a supported address format, it replaces the clipboard contents with an attacker-controlled wallet address taken from an internal list.

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

These binaries install persistence, continuously monitor the clipboard for strings that look like cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and replace them with attacker-controlled wallets from large, embedded lists.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.

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No public activity observed for this malware family.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching15Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.