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Malware1 associated actor

HavocKiller

Tracked since Jun 18, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Rootkit
Capabilities
Defense evasionByovd
Platforms
Windows

HavocKiller is a Windows bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver security-disabling tool used in ransomware intrusions to terminate or suppress endpoint protection products at kernel level. It is also referred to as HwAudKiller and is known for abusing a vulnerable Huawei audio driver to gain the privileged access needed to interfere with defensive software. Public reporting placed its disclosure in March 2026, while incident telemetry showed operational use dating back to at least January 2026.

The tool has been observed as part of the broader anti-EDR ecosystem used by The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service operation. In that context, HavocKiller appears to be an externally sourced or third-party component rather than an in-house development, alongside other security-killing tools such as HexKiller and ThrottleBlood. The Gentlemen integrated these tools into a standardized evasion suite, applying common disguising and packing practices to make binaries resemble legitimate security software and complicate analysis and attribution.

HavocKiller’s primary role is defense evasion during the pre-encryption phase of ransomware attacks. By abusing a vulnerable signed driver, it enables privileged process termination from kernel space, helping attackers disable EDR and antivirus products before data theft or ransomware deployment proceeds. High-confidence reporting supports its use in Windows ransomware operations and its classification as a BYOVD-based EDR killer rather than a general-purpose payload.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TheGentlemen

HavocKiller, which abuses a Huawei audio driver.

via infosecurity magazine newsinfosecurity-magazine.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.003Code Signing CertificatesEvidence1

ESET’s assessment is that all three were acquired externally by the operators and then standardized with the same defense evasion layer applied to GentleKiller: binary protection via Enigma or Themida, filenames mimicking security vendors, fabricated version information, copied digital signatures, and matching icons.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell GentleKiller and related tools are console-based executables that run visibly and emit debug strings during execution.

T1106Native APIEvidence3

T1106 Native API User-mode components interact directly with kernel drivers via DeviceIoControl and other native Windows APIs to perform privileged actions.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Persistence T1574 Hijack Execution Flow BYOVD driver hijacking execution flow to kernel

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

Persistence T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service The EDR killers install and start vulnerable or malicious drivers as services prior to exploitation.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence6

The method is called bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD). Each build loads a legitimately signed but flawed kernel driver, then abuses it to kill security processes from inside the kernel, beyond the reach of user-mode protections.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

Persistence T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service The EDR killers install and start vulnerable or malicious drivers as services prior to exploitation.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Some executables are protected with packers (e.g., Enigma, Themida) and custom control-flow obfuscation.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence3

To bypass inspection, the binaries carry fake version details, copied but invalid digital signatures and the icons of the vendors they mimic, often wrapped in commercial packers.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence9

Stealth T1036 Masquerading Gentlemen’s EDR killers are protected by impersonating legitimate vendors through filenames, version information, icons, and copied digital certificates.

T1036.001Invalid Code SignatureEvidence2

T1036.001 Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature The protection applied to Gentlemen’s EDR killers adds an invalid code signature as part of the impersonation strategy.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

The overarching defense-evasion strategy includes applying advanced protection to executable files, spoofing trusted vendors' identities and manipulating file attributes to make the EDR-killing tools harder to detect and analyze.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Persistence T1574 Hijack Execution Flow BYOVD driver hijacking execution flow to kernel

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence2

These tools are standardized through a shared defense-evasion layer, impersonating predominantly security vendors using fake version information, and copied through legitimate certificates and icons.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence9

GentleKiller's job is to disable endpoint protection. ESET found it targeting more than 400 processes across roughly 48 security products... attempting to disable them at the kernel level so the ransomware could run unchecked.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.