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Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

GentleKiller

Tracked since Jun 18, 2026 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days5 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs65Tracked
Type
Trojan
Capabilities
Defense evasionByovd
Platforms
Windows

GentleKiller is a Windows endpoint-security-disabling framework developed and maintained by The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service operators and supplied to their affiliates. Observed in intrusions by February 2026 and publicly documented by ESET in June 2026, it is deployed after compromise to impair endpoint protection before ransomware encryption.

The framework comprises at least eight variants that abuse different vulnerable or malicious kernel drivers. Its bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) implementations load legitimately signed but vulnerable drivers and exploit their kernel-level functionality to terminate security processes. GentleKiller repeatedly scans for and terminates processes from a target list containing more than 400 process names associated with approximately 48 security products, including Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike, Sophos, and ESET.

GentleKiller variants masquerade as legitimate security, anti-cheat, or utility software using fabricated version information, vendor icons, and copied but invalid digital signatures. Binaries are frequently protected with commercial packers such as Enigma or Themida. The operators centrally maintain the framework and incorporate newly disclosed driver-abuse techniques into their tooling. GentleKiller is distinct from The Gentlemen's ransomware encryptor and from externally sourced EDR killers distributed alongside it.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2019-6494via loldriversExploited in the wildArbitrary File Deletion via IOCTL in IObit Malware Fighter 6.2 IMFForceDelete.sysESET documents GentleKiller's Cleaner variant dropping this driver without the trailing .sys extension, and CVE-2019-6494 describes IOCTL 0x8016E000 allowing low-privileged users to delete files regardless of access controls.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TheGentlemen

Reporting indicates continued exploitation of FortiOS (CVE-2024-55591), Erlang/OTP SSH (CVE-2025-32433), and the Windows SMB client (CVE-2025-33073), along with abuse of the vulnerable ThrottleStop.sys driver (CVE-2025-7771) and a custom EDR killer named GentleKiller.

via dragos blogdragos.com
GOLD SHERWOOD

EDR killers (BYOVD) — ESET a documenté en juin 2026 la fourniture aux affiliés d’une suite d’outils exploitant des drivers vulnérables. Variantes observées par la CTU : GentleKiller – Watchdog, GentleKiller – Javelin, GentleKiller – G11 et GentleKiller – FACEIT Anti-Cheat.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
Phantom Mantis

Operational ownership does not imply common code authorship. G12 and G13 show technical continuity with the GentleKiller line.

via catalyst prodaftcatalyst.prodaft.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.003Code Signing CertificatesEvidence1

ESET’s assessment is that all three were acquired externally by the operators and then standardized with the same defense evasion layer applied to GentleKiller: binary protection via Enigma or Themida, filenames mimicking security vendors, fabricated version information, copied digital signatures, and matching icons.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell GentleKiller and related tools are console-based executables that run visibly and emit debug strings during execution.

T1106Native APIEvidence3

T1106 Native API User-mode components interact directly with kernel drivers via DeviceIoControl and other native Windows APIs to perform privileged actions.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Persistence T1574 Hijack Execution Flow BYOVD driver hijacking execution flow to kernel

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

The loader carries a legitimate Microsoft-signed driver embedded in its .data section, writes the driver to disk, and installs it as a service.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

Persistence T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service The EDR killers install and start vulnerable or malicious drivers as services prior to exploitation.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence12

The method is called bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD). Each build loads a legitimately signed but flawed kernel driver, then abuses it to kill security processes from inside the kernel, beyond the reach of user-mode protections.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

Persistence T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service The EDR killers install and start vulnerable or malicious drivers as services prior to exploitation.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

IObit Malware Fighter IMFForceDelete.sys is a vulnerable force-delete filter driver... ESET documents GentleKiller's Cleaner variant dropping this driver without the trailing .sys extension.

Stealth

12 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

Use Case Privileges Operating System Impair defenses through a signed kernel driver abused by an EDR killer.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence6

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Some executables are protected with packers (e.g., Enigma, Themida) and custom control-flow obfuscation.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence4

To bypass inspection, the binaries carry fake version details, copied but invalid digital signatures and the icons of the vendors they mimic, often wrapped in commercial packers.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence12

ESET counted at least eight GentleKiller variants, each impersonating a different legitimate product, with names lifted from games and security brands such as Valorant, FACEIT and Kaspersky... To bypass inspection, the binaries carry fake version details, copied but invalid digital signatures and the icons of the vendors they mimic, often wrapped in commercial packers.

T1036.001Invalid Code SignatureEvidence3

T1036.001 Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature The protection applied to Gentlemen’s EDR killers adds an invalid code signature as part of the impersonation strategy.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

It either terminates each running process directly, unloads the EDR’s own kernel driver, deletes service registry keys to prevent restart, or all three.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence4

Delete protected files and impair defenses through a vulnerable kernel driver.

T1211Exploitation for StealthEvidence6

The RaaS operators provide affiliates with a suite of custom and publicly available EDR-killing tools that abuse vulnerable drivers via the BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) technique.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

He just hands Windows a file the system already trusts... a trusted-but-flawed file... Windows will still happily load it.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

Attackers staged tools in the C:\PerfLogs directory ... not commonly scrutinized by security controls or administrators.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Persistence T1574 Hijack Execution Flow BYOVD driver hijacking execution flow to kernel

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

The loader carries a legitimate Microsoft-signed driver embedded in its .data section, writes the driver to disk, and installs it as a service.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence2

ESET notes that the threat actor also uses stolen digital signatures from legitimate software, although they are invalid.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence23

Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) was the second most common technique in our campaign data, appearing in 40 of 94 ransomware campaigns.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

ESET notes that the threat actor also uses stolen digital signatures from legitimate software, although they are invalid.

Discovery

1 technique
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

the killer enumerates a hardcoded list of EDR product names, service names, driver names, and process names

Collection

1 technique
T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence1

In multiple incidents analyzed by CTU researchers, the attackers staged tools in the C:\PerfLogs directory.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Disabling the endpoint agent is now a precondition for reliable encryption... The affiliate then proceeds with the rest of the playbook: enumeration, data staging, exfiltration, then encryption.

T1489Service StopEvidence2

ESET states that GentleKiller targets more than 400 processes associated with approximately 48 security vendors/products...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

65 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

33 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching65Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.