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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

TinyRCT

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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAT-7237

Analysis of the binary's internal strings revealed that the authors refer to this tool as TinyRCT. TinyRCT is a lightweight, C#-based remote access Trojan (RAT) targeting Windows. It operates as a backdoor, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary system commands, exfiltrate files, capture screenshots and remotely manage the infected host.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
CL-STA-1062

Government entities and critical infrastructure were targeted for espionage in SE Asia by attackers using a hybrid toolkit, including custom TinyRCT backdoor.

via malware newsmalware.news
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The task is configured to run the malware with the highest available privileges (e.g., /rl highest ) every time the user logs on to the system (e.g., /sc onlogon ). This ensures that the infection survives system reboots.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

These web shells function as the central mechanism for executing arbitrary commands, dropping additional tooling and conducting initial reconnaissance.

T1574.014AppDomainManagerEvidence1

This specific combination of files is used to perform AppDomainManager Injection – a technique that exploits the trust relationship between a .NET application and its configuration file.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The task is configured to run the malware with the highest available privileges (e.g., /rl highest ) every time the user logs on to the system (e.g., /sc onlogon ). This ensures that the infection survives system reboots.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The task is configured to run the malware with the highest available privileges (e.g., /rl highest ) every time the user logs on to the system (e.g., /sc onlogon ). This ensures that the infection survives system reboots.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

These tools were often disguised as legitimate system files, such as VMware executables or an XDR agent.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Upon receiving the self-destruct command, the malware first deletes the GoogleUpdater scheduled task created by the loader. It then executes a self-deletion routine

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Upon execution, the malware performs an environment validation to explicitly verify that it was executed from %LOCALAPPDATA% . If the malware was executed from any other location – such as a sandbox environment or a malware analyst’s desktop – the binary terminates immediately.

T1574.014AppDomainManagerEvidence1

This specific combination of files is used to perform AppDomainManager Injection – a technique that exploits the trust relationship between a .NET application and its configuration file.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Host Fingerprinting and Registration Before entering its main command loop, TinyRCT conducts initial reconnaissance to fingerprint the infected host... collecting the following data points: ... Local IP addresses

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

TinyRCT conducts initial reconnaissance to fingerprint the infected host... collecting the following data points: User and system context: Current username, machine name and OS version.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

As part of our observations of CL-STA-1062, we noted activity sending the results of network and system enumeration directly to an actor-controlled IP address using curl.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

File listing: Enumerates directories and files in the specified path. Returns format: Filename*Date*Size .

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Upon execution, the malware performs an environment validation to explicitly verify that it was executed from %LOCALAPPDATA% . If the malware was executed from any other location – such as a sandbox environment or a malware analyst’s desktop – the binary terminates immediately.

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Screen capture: Captures the primary screen, saves the capture as a JPEG file, compresses it, encrypts it and sends it to the C2.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The malware uses standard HTTP for network traffic... It polls the C2 server for instructions using GET requests, while it sends exfiltrated data via POST requests.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

These requests connected to attacker-controlled infrastructure and resulted in the victim networks downloading malicious payloads that included SoftEther VPN components and RAR archives containing the group's tools.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The malware uses standard HTTP for network traffic... It polls the C2 server for instructions using GET requests, while it sends exfiltrated data via POST requests.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
4 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching10

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping14

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.