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Mallory
Malware

TonRAT

Tracked since Jun 26, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs132Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ReconnaissancePersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionExfiltration
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

TonRAT is a Node.js-based remote access trojan used in phishing campaigns targeting hospitality organizations, particularly hotel operators and front-desk environments in Europe and Asia. It has been delivered through booking-themed social engineering lures, including fake guest complaints and bedbug-related messages, with victims redirected to archives containing malicious Windows shortcut files. Execution typically begins with a PowerShell-based loader chain that decrypts an obfuscated JavaScript payload, installs or reuses a legitimate Node.js runtime, and launches the implant in user space.

The malware combines remote access and downloader functionality. It performs host reconnaissance by collecting system and user information, establishes persistence through Windows autorun mechanisms, and communicates with operators over encrypted WebSocket channels. TonRAT supports arbitrary command execution and can download and run additional payloads, enabling broader post-compromise activity. Observed tradecraft also includes defense evasion measures such as heavy JavaScript obfuscation, hidden PowerShell execution, mutex use, and the addition of Microsoft Defender exclusions in some intrusion chains.

A distinctive feature of TonRAT is its use of The Open Network (TON) ecosystem for command-and-control discovery. Rather than relying on a fixed embedded domain, the implant queries a public TON API to retrieve current C2 domain information associated with attacker-controlled blockchain data, allowing operators to rotate infrastructure without rebuilding the malware. After resolving the active endpoint, TonRAT establishes an encrypted session using a key-exchange mechanism and then protects subsequent traffic with symmetric encryption over WebSocket.

TonRAT has been associated with Booking.com-themed phishing operations and broader hospitality-focused intrusion activity observed in 2026. Public reporting has not conclusively attributed the campaign to a named threat actor. The malware’s delivery chain, resilient persistence, dynamic C2 resolution, and support for follow-on payload execution indicate its role as a flexible access platform for sustained compromise of Windows systems.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence6

Booking.com を騙ってホテル関係者へ送信したフィッシングメールであると判断できます。

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The investigation uncovered a layered execution flow in which an initial ZIP archive contains an LNK file that launches PowerShell to retrieve a secondary script.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence7

Booking.com を装ったメールがホテル運営会社へ送付される / メール内のリンクをクリックすると zip ファイルがダウンロードされる

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

TonRAT は任意のコマンド実行の機能を持ちます。C2 サーバーからコマンドを受け取り、実行結果を以下の通り応答します。

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence8

lnk ファイルには PowerShell コマンドが含まれており、ユーザーがこのlnkファイルを開くことで実行されます。このコマンドが実行されると、 Invoke-WebRequest を使用してハードコードされている通信先から別の PowerShell ファイルを取得し、実行します。

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Some hosts showed headless browser automation with --headless --no-sandbox flags, a geolocation check via ip-api.com, and a forced shutdown through cmd /c shutdown -s -t 0 .

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence8

PowerShell コマンドがファイル内の暗号化された JavaScript ファイル(TonRAT)を復号し、ファイルとして書き出す

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence6

zip ファイル内の lnk ファイルを実行すると PowerShell コマンドが実行され、追加で PowerShell ファイル(ps1)がダウンロードされ実行される

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence6

PowerShell 経由で HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run キーの既存値を確認

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

lnk ファイルには PowerShell コマンドが含まれており、ユーザーがこの lnk ファイルを開くことで、PowerShell コマンドが実行されます。

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence6

PowerShell 経由で HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run キーの既存値を確認

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

lnk ファイルには PowerShell コマンドが含まれており、ユーザーがこの lnk ファイルを開くことで、PowerShell コマンドが実行されます。

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

今回、当社が観測した攻撃には以下の特徴があります。… 難読化された PowerShell ローダー、JavaScript ファイル

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

Booking.com を装ったメール

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

PowerShell コマンドがファイル内の暗号化された JavaScript ファイル(TonRAT)を復号し、ファイルとして書き出す

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

zip ファイルの中には lnk ファイルと mp4 ファイルがあります... lnk ファイルには PowerShell コマンドが含まれており、ユーザーがこのlnkファイルを開くことで実行されます。

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

That challenge serves double duty as an anti-analysis gate and a geolocation filter before the payload lands... Some hosts showed... a geolocation check via ip-api.com

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

ShowWindow メソッドを使ってウィンドウを非表示にすることで、ユーザーに異常を気づかれにくくしていると考えられます。

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

It also adds a Microsoft Defender exclusion for its own dropped file, which helps it avoid scans.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

TonRAT が感染端末の情報収集と動作の永続化を行い... / 感染端末のシステム情報を C2 サーバーへ送信

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

That challenge serves double duty as an anti-analysis gate and a geolocation filter before the payload lands... Some hosts showed... a geolocation check via ip-api.com

Collection

2 techniques
T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Some hosts also showed headless browser automation (--headless --no-sandbox)...

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

最終的に zip ファイルがダウンロードされます。

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

This implant communicates with its command and control servers using the TON blockchain API and opens an encrypted WebSocket channel.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence6

TonRAT が TON API から取得した C2 へ WebSocket で接続する

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Victims are directed through multiple redirects to a malicious .cfd domain.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

Invoke-WebRequest を使用してハードコードされている通信先から別の PowerShell ファイルを取得し、実行します。

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The implant supports remote code execution. It can download and run Windows programs, plus PowerShell and JavaScript.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence5

TonRAT が TON API を使用して C2 のドメインを取得する

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence2

Communications sur ports non-standard : 8443, 8445, 8453, 5555, 56001, 56002, 56003

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

WebSocket 接続後、クライアントと C2 間で ECDH(Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman)鍵交換によるハンドシェイクが行われます。

Impact

1 technique
T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

Some hosts also showed headless browser automation (--headless --no-sandbox), an ip-api.com geolocation check, and a forced shutdown via cmd /c shutdown -s -t 0.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

132 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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security online infoNews · Jul 15, 2026Node.js Backdoor Hides C2 on the TON BlockchainA Node.js-based backdoor delivered via booking-themed phishing emails targeting hotel staff. It uses a malicious LNK and PowerShell to install or leverage Node.js, decrypt and run an obfuscated JavaScript payload, establish persistence, fetch C2 information from the TON blockchain via the EtherHiding technique, open an encrypted WebSocket channel, execute remote commands, download and run additional payloads, and add a Microsoft Defender exclusion for its dropped file.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Jun 30, 2026Campagne Photo ZIP ciblant l'hôtellerie : implant Node.js et persistance duale via registre | CyberVeilleNamed by the content as a malware/tool associated with the described Node.js implant campaign delivering persistent access.Read more ↗scworldNews · Jun 29, 2026Photo-themed phishing campaign targets European and Asian hotels with Node.js implant | brief | SC MediaA Node.js-based remote access implant delivered via phishing ZIP files targeting hotel and hospitality organizations. It is executed through a PowerShell-based infection chain, uses the TON blockchain API for command-and-control communications, opens an encrypted WebSocket channel, and establishes persistence via RunOnce entries and Node.js Run keys.Read more ↗security affairsNews · Jun 27, 2026Hospitality Sector Hit by Phishing Campaign Using Fake Guest Complaint EmailsA JavaScript-based implant executed via a user-space Node.js runtime, used in a phishing campaign against hospitality organizations. It establishes persistence through HKCU\Run and a self-refreshing HKCU\RunOnce mechanism, reconnects to C2 infrastructure, and can resume delivering additional payloads after partial remediation.Read more ↗
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IOC matching132Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.