Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

ZOHOMURK

Tracked since Jun 29, 2026 · Updated 2 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

ZOHOMURK is a Windows backdoor used by the China-linked cyberespionage group Mustang Panda. Identified in June 2026 operations against Indian government entities, it was deployed in a campaign using memorandum-of-understanding lures concerning Indian and Taiwanese institutions. The infection chain used spearphishing archives, DLL sideloading through legitimate signed applications, and SHARDLOADER to deploy the implant.

ZOHOMURK abuses an attacker-controlled Zoho WorkDrive account for command-and-control, remote task execution, and data exfiltration. It authenticates using hardcoded OAuth credentials, including a refresh token, client identifier, and client secret. The implant creates per-victim folders, polls an inbox for tasking files, and uploads command results and stolen data to an outbox. It supports interactive shell access, file operations, and shell termination, and trashes consumed tasking files. A heartbeat mechanism re-registers the victim if its WorkDrive folder structure is removed.

The implant derives a victim identifier from the computer's hostname and public IP address, then encodes the identifier for use in its cloud folder structure. It employs performance-counter timing checks to detect analysis environments, and a documented variant establishes persistence through a per-user Run entry that launches a sideloading executable. Its use of legitimate cloud APIs allows command traffic and exfiltrated data to blend with ordinary WorkDrive activity.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Mustang Panda

Campaign II (MOU / Taiwan) deploys ZOHOMURK, a novel implant that abuses Zoho WorkDrive, a legitimate cloud storage platform widely used in the Indian government sector, for command-and-control, data exfiltration, and remote task execution.

via socradar blogsocradar.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

ZOHOMURK is a newly identified implant that leverages Zoho WorkDrive for command-and-control, data exfiltration and remote task execution.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

the group has steadily expanded its toolkit in response to law enforcement action and growing defender awareness.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Both were delivered as ZIP archives, distributed via spearphishing, in which the malicious DLL was marked with the hidden attribute.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Acronis published indicators and hunting tips, including the persistence Run keys, a scheduled task named SolidPDFPcl2Bmp...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Monitor for scheduled tasks with short repetition intervals pointing to executables in user-writable directories (for example the SolidPDFPcl2Bmp task with a five-minute trigger).

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

the implant supports two parallel reverse shells... remote command execution... Opcode 8 is used for interactive shell access... The payload is then written to the pipe

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Acronis published indicators and hunting tips, including the persistence Run keys, a scheduled task named SolidPDFPcl2Bmp...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Monitor for scheduled tasks with short repetition intervals pointing to executables in user-writable directories (for example the SolidPDFPcl2Bmp task with a five-minute trigger).

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

Alert on new Run keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with suspicious value names

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Acronis published indicators and hunting tips, including the persistence Run keys, a scheduled task named SolidPDFPcl2Bmp...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Monitor for scheduled tasks with short repetition intervals pointing to executables in user-writable directories (for example the SolidPDFPcl2Bmp task with a five-minute trigger).

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

Alert on new Run keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with suspicious value names

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Both were delivered as ZIP archives, distributed via spearphishing, in which the malicious DLL was marked with the hidden attribute.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Alert on trusted applications (Solid PDF Creator, Microsoft DNX, Citrix components) executing from non-standard paths.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

After identifying the environment as an analyst sandbox, the operator attempted to disrupt analysis by deleting tools and corrupting multiple files on the host... the implant removes it from WorkDrive by sending a PATCH request... which moves the file to trash.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After identifying the environment as an analyst sandbox, the operator attempted to disrupt analysis... The implant employs a timing-based anti-analysis technique using QueryPerformanceCounter.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

Both were delivered as ZIP archives, distributed via spearphishing, in which the malicious DLL was marked with the hidden attribute, a technique long associated with the group.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Once running, the implant generates a unique victim identifier by combining the hostname... with the system's public IP address... We also observed the operator actively conducting reconnaissance on the infected system.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

It supports interactive shell access, file operations, and a self-healing heartbeat that re-registers the victim if the C2 folders are removed.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After identifying the environment as an analyst sandbox, the operator attempted to disrupt analysis... The implant employs a timing-based anti-analysis technique using QueryPerformanceCounter.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

ZOHOMURK ... passes commands and stolen data as ordinary-looking cloud API traffic.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

ZOHOMURK is the most unusual piece of this operation. It carries hardcoded Zoho OAuth credentials and uses them to run an attacker-controlled WorkDrive account as a covert command channel.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

MINIRECON establishes a WebSocket connection over HTTPS using the native WinHTTP API... ZOHOMURK... sends a POST request to accounts.zoho.com/oauth/v2/token... HTTPS traffic to workdrive.zoho.com

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

ZOHOMURK , a novel implant that abuses Zoho WorkDrive ... for command-and-control, data exfiltration, and remote task execution.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

the implant extracts two embedded files from the .rdata section: pcl2bmp.exe, a legitimate signed Citrix Receiver binary, and ctxmui.dll, a malicious DLL... When a new command file is found in the victim's inbox, the implant downloads it to a temporary file named readata.dat on disk.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

MINIRECON ... upgrades C2 to a WebSocket connection over HTTPS ... disabling certificate validation to allow self-signed certificates

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

ZOHOMURK is a newly identified implant that leverages Zoho WorkDrive for command-and-control, data exfiltration and remote task execution... uploads the output back to the outbox for the operator to retrieve.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence3

Mustang Panda used SHARDLOADER, MINIRECON, and ZOHOMURK to exploit Zoho WorkDrive as a C2 and data exfiltration channel.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence2

ZOHOMURK ... abuses Zoho WorkDrive ... for command-and-control, data exfiltration, and remote task execution.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.