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Malware1 associated actor

SHARDLOADER

Tracked since Jun 29, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionDLL sideloadingPost exploitation
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

SHARDLOADER is a Windows malware loader associated with the China-linked espionage group Mustang Panda. It is designed to execute through DLL sideloading by pairing a malicious DLL with a legitimate, digitally signed application, allowing the malware to blend into normal software execution and evade scrutiny. Reported campaigns used spearphishing lures delivered in compressed archives, with the malicious DLL concealed alongside sideloading components.

SHARDLOADER has been observed establishing persistence on compromised hosts and then decrypting and launching follow-on payloads. Documented variants reconstructed embedded shellcode from internal data sections and executed it through callback-based techniques, while later variants extracted additional sideloading components and configured recurring execution through scheduled tasks. Its primary role is to stage and deploy secondary espionage implants rather than to conduct collection directly.

In observed Mustang Panda operations, SHARDLOADER delivered the implants MINIRECON and ZOHOMURK. MINIRECON is a TONESHELL-related backdoor used for remote command execution, file transfer, reverse shell access, and operator-driven reconnaissance. ZOHOMURK is an implant that abuses Zoho WorkDrive for command-and-control, remote tasking, and data exfiltration, helping malicious traffic blend with legitimate cloud-service usage. These campaigns targeted Indian government entities and the hydropower sector, reflecting intelligence-collection objectives aligned with long-term state-sponsored espionage.

SHARDLOADER demonstrates moderate sophistication through its use of DLL sideloading, persistence mechanisms, staged payload decryption, and support for covert post-compromise tooling. Its operational context, malware overlaps, and tradecraft link it to Mustang Panda activity focused on government, diplomatic, and other strategically significant targets.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Mustang Panda

Both campaigns opened the same way: a previously undocumented loader tracked as SHARDLOADER, delivered as a malicious DLL and sideloaded through a legitimate, digitally signed executable.

via socradar blogsocradar.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

the group has steadily expanded its toolkit in response to law enforcement action and growing defender awareness.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

Both were delivered as ZIP archives, distributed via spearphishing, in which the malicious DLL was marked with the hidden attribute.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Acronis published indicators and hunting tips, including the persistence Run keys, a scheduled task named SolidPDFPcl2Bmp...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

it uses the COM-based Task Scheduler API to register for a scheduled task named SolidPDFPcl2Bmp... configured to repeat every five minutes... Finally, the task is registered under the root folder

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Finally, the implant invokes EnumSystemLocalesA and abuses its callback mechanism to execute the shellcode in memory

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Both campaigns opened the same way: a previously undocumented loader tracked as SHARDLOADER, delivered as a malicious DLL and sideloaded through a legitimate, digitally signed executable.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Acronis published indicators and hunting tips, including the persistence Run keys, a scheduled task named SolidPDFPcl2Bmp...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

it uses the COM-based Task Scheduler API to register for a scheduled task named SolidPDFPcl2Bmp... configured to repeat every five minutes... Finally, the task is registered under the root folder

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

Alert on new Run keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with suspicious value names

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Acronis published indicators and hunting tips, including the persistence Run keys, a scheduled task named SolidPDFPcl2Bmp...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

it uses the COM-based Task Scheduler API to register for a scheduled task named SolidPDFPcl2Bmp... configured to repeat every five minutes... Finally, the task is registered under the root folder

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

Alert on new Run keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with suspicious value names

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Both were delivered as ZIP archives, distributed via spearphishing, in which the malicious DLL was marked with the hidden attribute.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Alert on trusted applications (Solid PDF Creator, Microsoft DNX, Citrix components) executing from non-standard paths.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Once assembled, each 512-byte chunk is passed through a decryption routine that applies a rolling XOR using a 28-byte key... reconstructs a fully decrypted 34,816-byte shellcode payload in memory.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence2

Both campaigns arrived as ZIP archives with the malicious DLL marked as hidden.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

Both were delivered as ZIP archives, distributed via spearphishing, in which the malicious DLL was marked with the hidden attribute, a technique long associated with the group.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Both campaigns arrive as ZIP archives with the malicious DLL marked hidden.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

SnakeDisk: A USB-propagated worm designed to target isolated or segmented environments by deploying a secondary backdoor on selected systems.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.