Malware

Tiny FUD

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The name change is done using osascript... The function _hide_file() executes the following command: SetFile -a V "%s"

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

After setting these values, it resigns itself with added runtime entitlements by calling _self_sign(), enabling: DYLD environment variables (for dynamic library injection).

Stealth

4 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

To blend in with legitimate system processes, the FUD binary randomly selects one of the following names... The name change is done using osascript, making it difficult to spot in Activity Monitor.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The _cleanup_and_exit() function... is designed to remove traces of the malware before shutting down... it removes the XPC_SERVICE_NAME environment variable... calls _unsetenv("DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES")... terminate all child processes.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

The FUD binary employs a stealth mechanism to remove itself from Finder view... The function _hide_file() executes the following command: SetFile -a V "%s"

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

After setting these values, it resigns itself with added runtime entitlements by calling _self_sign(), enabling: DYLD environment variables (for dynamic library injection).

Discovery

1 technique

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

the function includes a small execution delay... before collecting additional system information such as username, hostname, and kernel version.

Collection

1 technique

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Every 5 minutes, the malware captures a screenshot and sends it to the C2 server.

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The beacon message is then formatted and sent using chunked transfer encoding, making network traffic harder to detect.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The malware receives commands from the C2 server and executes them.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

denwp blogNews

Jan 30, 2025

Analyzing a Fully Undetectable (FUD) macOS Backdoor

A macOS trojan/backdoor designed for stealth and evasion. It manipulates its process name to resemble legitimate Apple services, re-signs itself with permissive entitlements to enable DYLD injection and memory protection bypasses, hides its file from Finder, establishes C2 communications, executes remote commands, sends periodic heartbeat data including screenshots, and performs cleanup/self-termination to reduce forensic traces.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

Tiny FUD

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The name change is done using osascript... The function _hide_file() executes the following command: SetFile -a V "%s"

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

After setting these values, it resigns itself with added runtime entitlements by calling _self_sign(), enabling: DYLD environment variables (for dynamic library injection).

Stealth

4 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

To blend in with legitimate system processes, the FUD binary randomly selects one of the following names... The name change is done using osascript, making it difficult to spot in Activity Monitor.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

The FUD binary employs a stealth mechanism to remove itself from Finder view... The function _hide_file() executes the following command: SetFile -a V "%s"

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

After setting these values, it resigns itself with added runtime entitlements by calling _self_sign(), enabling: DYLD environment variables (for dynamic library injection).

Discovery

1 technique

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

the function includes a small execution delay... before collecting additional system information such as username, hostname, and kernel version.

Collection

1 technique

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Every 5 minutes, the malware captures a screenshot and sends it to the C2 server.

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The beacon message is then formatted and sent using chunked transfer encoding, making network traffic harder to detect.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The malware receives commands from the C2 server and executes them.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

denwp blogNews

Jan 30, 2025

Analyzing a Fully Undetectable (FUD) macOS Backdoor

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.