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Malware1 associated actor

BRUTED

Tracked since Jul 7, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Black Basta

Analysts named this offensive framework BRUTED based on its log naming conventions. According to source code analysis, main capability of this framework´s main capability is to perform automated internet scanning and credential stuffing against edge network devices, including widely used firewalls and VPN solutions in corporate networks.

via eclecticiq blogblog.eclecticiq.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

2 techniques
T1590.002DNSEvidence1

It queries subdomains by prepending a series of known or likely prefixes (e.g., vpn, remote, mail, etc.) to a base domain, then resolves each resulting name to IP addresses.

T1595.003Wordlist ScanningEvidence1

Scanning the internet: Automate subdomain enumeration and IP resolution for a given domain, effectively “scanning the internet” for potentially valid hostnames and IP addresses. It queries subdomains by prepending a series of known or likely prefixes (e.g., vpn, remote, mail, etc.) to a base domain.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Black Basta follows a structured attack chain, beginning with the compromise of edge network devices through brute-force attacks, stolen credentials, and known vulnerabilities.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

The BRUTED framework target various remote-access and VPN solutions. It supports multiple vendors and technologies—including SonicWall NetExtender, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Cisco AnyConnect, Fortinet SSL VPN, Citrix NetScaler (Citrix Gateway), Microsoft RDWeb, and WatchGuard SSL VPN to gain initial access to victim networks.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

Distributed/Parallel Execution: Spawns multiple processes (via shell_exec) to scale brute-force attempts depending on CPU cores.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Black Basta follows a structured attack chain, beginning with the compromise of edge network devices through brute-force attacks, stolen credentials, and known vulnerabilities.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

The BRUTED framework target various remote-access and VPN solutions. It supports multiple vendors and technologies—including SonicWall NetExtender, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Cisco AnyConnect, Fortinet SSL VPN, Citrix NetScaler (Citrix Gateway), Microsoft RDWeb, and WatchGuard SSL VPN to gain initial access to victim networks.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Black Basta follows a structured attack chain, beginning with the compromise of edge network devices through brute-force attacks, stolen credentials, and known vulnerabilities.

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Black Basta follows a structured attack chain, beginning with the compromise of edge network devices through brute-force attacks, stolen credentials, and known vulnerabilities.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1110.002Password CrackingEvidence1

Credential Generation & Retrieval: Gathers password candidates from a remote server, combines them with locally generated guesses, and performs bulk authentication attempts.

T1110.004Credential StuffingEvidence1

EclecticIQ analysts assess that Black Basta targets edge network devices for credential-stuffing attacks, exploiting weak or reused credentials to gain an initial foothold for lateral movement, and ransomware deployment.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

According to source code analysis, main capability of this framework´s main capability is to perform automated internet scanning and credential stuffing against edge network devices.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Reporting & Logging: Sends progress and potential successful credentials back to a command-and-control (C2) server (e.g., via /get-items.php, /done-check.php).

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

Proxy Rotation: Uses a large list of SOCKS5 proxies (all from the domain fuck-you-usa[.]com) to hide attacker server IP while performing high volume of brute forcing request.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.