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Mallory
Malware

NodeJS-based backdoor

Tracked since Jul 9, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs25Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The campaign begins with a spam email targeting the hospitality sector using booking themed lures.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

When executed, the shortcut launches the PowerShell command... The downloaded PowerShell payload performs several post-execution steps to establish its runtime environment and prepare the next stage of the attack chain.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Finally, the malicious payload is executed via the installed or newly deployed Node.js runtime using the following command: Node.exe <JS payload> <decrypted c2>

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The email contains a link hosted on Google Share... After redirection, the victim is prompted to retrieve a ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK file... The LNK file uses an icon from shell32.dll to make it look like an image file tricking the victim to run it.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The function D() is responsible for establishing persistence on the infected system. It executes a PowerShell command that creates a new Run Registry key.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The function D() is responsible for establishing persistence on the infected system. It executes a PowerShell command that creates a new Run Registry key.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The PowerShell command is obfuscated using two large integer (bigint) values... The resulting payload is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code... the malware interprets encoded bytecode at runtime.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

One of the malware's functions is to determine whether another instance of the dropped node.exe process is already running... Function X() is responsible for verifying internet connectivity before the malware proceeds with its execution.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Adds a Windows Defender exclusion for the file path using: Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess "{path}"

Discovery

2 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

powershell.exe -c "(Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.Path -eq \"%AppData%\Nodejs\node-v24.13.0-win-x64\node.exe\" }).Count"

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

One of the malware's functions is to determine whether another instance of the dropped node.exe process is already running... Function X() is responsible for verifying internet connectivity before the malware proceeds with its execution.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

After retrieving the C2 URL, the malware establishes a new WebSocket connection using the following format: wss://<C2>/w?user_id=<guid>

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

If Node.js is not installed, the script downloads a legitimate Node.js package from the official distribution site... The malware can download and execute additional payloads, supporting Windows executables as well as PowerShell and JavaScript execution.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

DownloadAndRun and Remote Code Execution The malware can download and execute additional payloads, supporting Windows executables as well as PowerShell and JavaScript execution.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The malware also uses the EtherHiding technique, leveraging the TON blockchain to retrieve its command-and-control (C2) address... allowing threat actors to update the C2 address... without modifications to the malware itself.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching25Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.