Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In this blog, we will walk through the complete technical analysis of the final payload which we named as SheetAgent RAT, including the tokens and keys used to communicate with Google Drive and Google Sheets.
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The primary persistence mechanism relies on a Windows Scheduled Task named WindowsDefenderSyncService which resembles a legitimate Windows service.
The primary persistence mechanism relies on a Windows Scheduled Task named WindowsDefenderSyncService which resembles a legitimate Windows service.
If the scheduled task cannot be created, the malware falls back to a second persistence mechanism using the Windows Startup folder. It creates a shortcut named WindowsDefenderSync.lnk... and places it in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\.
The primary persistence mechanism relies on a Windows Scheduled Task named WindowsDefenderSyncService which resembles a legitimate Windows service.
If the scheduled task cannot be created, the malware falls back to a second persistence mechanism using the Windows Startup folder. It creates a shortcut named WindowsDefenderSync.lnk... and places it in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Defense Evasion T1027.011 Obfuscated Files or Information
After execution, Document.exe creates a directory named %APPDATA%\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\. The folder name closely resembles a legitimate Windows component.
The cleanup routine creates a temporary batch file named cleanup.bat... forcefully deletes the malware executable, removes its configuration file (service.json), deletes the batch file itself, and then exits.
Upon examining the script, we found that it invokes powershell.exe with a long Base64-encoded command supplied through the -EncodedCommand parameter. After decoding the embedded command...
12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.