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Malware1 associated actor

SheetAgent RAT

Tracked since Jul 14, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs12Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT36

In this blog, we will walk through the complete technical analysis of the final payload which we named as SheetAgent RAT, including the tokens and keys used to communicate with Google Drive and Google Sheets.

via malware newsmalware.news
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

The primary persistence mechanism relies on a Windows Scheduled Task named WindowsDefenderSyncService which resembles a legitimate Windows service.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Upon analyzing the LNK file, we found that its description was set to “Install ControlR Agent”... we observed that it invokes powershell.exe to execute JT-agenda.ps1.

T1106Native APIEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Execution T1106 Native API

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The initial infection begins with the LNK file, which has been disguised with a Microsoft Edge browser icon to appear as a legitimate document.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

The primary persistence mechanism relies on a Windows Scheduled Task named WindowsDefenderSyncService which resembles a legitimate Windows service.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

If the scheduled task cannot be created, the malware falls back to a second persistence mechanism using the Windows Startup folder. It creates a shortcut named WindowsDefenderSync.lnk... and places it in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

The primary persistence mechanism relies on a Windows Scheduled Task named WindowsDefenderSyncService which resembles a legitimate Windows service.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

If the scheduled task cannot be created, the malware falls back to a second persistence mechanism using the Windows Startup folder. It creates a shortcut named WindowsDefenderSync.lnk... and places it in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\.

T1548.004Elevated Execution with PromptEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Privilege Escalation T1548.004 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Defense Evasion T1027.011 Obfuscated Files or Information

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

After execution, Document.exe creates a directory named %APPDATA%\Microsoft\WinSyncDefender\. The folder name closely resembles a legitimate Windows component.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

The cleanup routine creates a temporary batch file named cleanup.bat... forcefully deletes the malware executable, removes its configuration file (service.json), deletes the batch file itself, and then exits.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

Upon examining the script, we found that it invokes powershell.exe with a long Base64-encoded command supplied through the -EncodedCommand parameter. After decoding the embedded command...

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

The malware performs a total of 14 different virtualization detection techniques.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

The other two files, Document.exe and JT-agenda.ps1, were configured with the Hidden file attribute, making them invisible under the default Windows File Explorer settings.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

It checks the system manufacturer and BIOS information using WMI, looks for virtualization-related disk drives and graphics adapters...

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

The malware performs a total of 14 different virtualization detection techniques.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Discovery T1614.001 System Location Discovery

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

the malware continuously reads commands written by the attacker in the Google Sheet, executes them on the victim’s machine, and writes the execution results back to the same row.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.