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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Three malicious versions of AsyncAPI packages were published to npm on 2026-07-14 at 07:10 UTC via a compromised CI workflow. A threat actor gained write access to the next branch and pushed a commit injecting a credential-stealing RAT dropper into the source of all three packages.
A threat actor gained write access to the next branch and pushed a commit injecting a credential-stealing RAT dropper into the source of all three packages. The release workflow on the next branch triggered automatically, and asyncapi-bot published all three packages via GitHub Actions OIDC within seconds.
The commit modified three source files in the monorepo, injecting a ~7.7KB obfuscated JavaScript payload as a whitespace-padded single line (hidden ~1000 spaces off-screen) in each.
Creates a hidden directory based on OS: Linux: ~/.local/share/NodeJS/ macOS: ~/Library/Application Support/NodeJS/ Windows: %LOCALAPPDATA%\NodeJS\
Dead-man switch ( safe-wipe.js ) that monitors a stolen token and triggers a directory wipe if the token is revoked.
Stage 3 - Miasma RAT ( sync.js , fully decrypted) sync.js is a self-decrypting AES-256-GCM payload (HKDF-SHA256, hardcoded master key rt-vault-master-key-32b-aaaaaaaa ). Once decrypted it is a full credential-stealing RAT
the main() function calls spawn('node', ['-e', PAYLOAD_STRING], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true }).unref().
Credential targets: Browser profiles: Login Data , Cookies , Local State (Chrome, Brave, Firefox, Edge)
A representative sample of targeted paths from the decrypted source: ~/.aws/* ... ~/.npmrc ... ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml ... ~/.docker/config.json
SSH keys: ~/.ssh/id_rsa , ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 , ~/.ssh/config npm token: ~/.npmrc GitHub CLI: ~/.config/gh/ AWS: ~/.aws/credentials Git config: ~/.gitconfig
18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.