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Malware1 associated actor

Starland RAT

Tracked since Jul 16, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK50Techniques
IOCs54Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injectionCrypto theft
Delivery
ClickfixCracked softwareLure
Platforms
Windows

Starland RAT is a Python-based remote access trojan used by the financially motivated, Russian-speaking threat actor UAT-11795 in campaigns active since at least June 2025. It has been observed primarily against Windows users in the United States, with additional victimology in Europe and Venezuela, and appears particularly focused on credential theft and cryptocurrency wallet theft.

The malware is delivered through social-engineering-driven infection chains that use ClickFix-style lures and trojanized installers masquerading as legitimate software. In observed intrusions, a staged loader chain executes Starland RAT directly in memory, helping reduce on-disk exposure while preserving the appearance of a normal software installation.

Once active, Starland RAT performs anti-analysis checks against common sandbox usernames and hostnames, gathers host reconnaissance, and inventories security and domain context. Reported collection includes hardware and operating system details, installed antivirus products, Active Directory membership and privilege context, screenshots, browser-related data, and the presence of more than 40 cryptocurrency wallet applications and browser extensions. The malware exfiltrates collected victim information to command-and-control infrastructure using encoded and encrypted communications.

Starland RAT establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and Startup-folder shortcuts, and some reporting also indicates attempts to elevate privileges. It supports remote shell command execution, delivery of additional payloads, and injection or execution of both 32-bit and 64-bit shellcode, making it suitable as both an access tool and a staging platform for follow-on malware. Observed secondary payloads associated with Starland RAT activity include CastleStealer, Remcos RAT, and the bespoke WLDR PowerShell memory implant.

A notable resilience feature is its fallback command-and-control discovery mechanism, which retrieves backup infrastructure information from a Polygon smart contract when primary infrastructure is unavailable. This, combined with in-memory execution, anti-analysis logic, and modular payload delivery, makes Starland RAT a flexible intrusion platform for long-term access, credential theft, cryptocurrency targeting, and broader post-compromise operations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAT-11795

The operation employs suspected ClickFix-style social engineering, trojanized software installers, and a custom Python-based remote access tool, Starland RAT, to establish persistent access and deploy additional malware, including the previously undocumented WLDR PowerShell framework, CastleStealer, and Remcos RAT.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

50 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

the threat actor distributes the payload via trojanized installers for legitimate software such as MobaXterm, WebEx, Zoom, DBeaver, and FaceIT

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

employing trojanized installers for legitimate software to steal credentials and cryptocurrency

Execution

9 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The RAT establishes persistence using scheduled tasks and Startup folder shortcuts while performing anti-analysis checks against common sandbox usernames and hostnames before initiating malicious activity.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

Persistence is established through a randomized scheduled task named PythonLauncher followed by three characters with an AtLogOn trigger...

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence6

After registration, the RAT polls its C2 server approximately every 50 to 60 seconds and supports execution of shell commands, process injection of both 32-bit and 64-bit shellcode, and delivery of additional executable payloads.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

At the operator discretion, Starland RAT deploys the WLDR Agent by executing an embedded PowerShell script... WLDR runs a PowerShell RunspacePool of up to ten concurrent threads...

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence4

It can run shell commands, inject 32-bit or 64-bit shellcode, or download more files.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

This runs an embedded VBScript that drops a Windows batch file into the user profile’s application temporary folder

T1059.006PythonEvidence3

According to Talos, the actor “delivers a Python-based remote access tool” that runs in memory.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence6

The campaign begins with suspected ClickFix-style social engineering, reflecting a broader industry trend in which threat actors increasingly rely on user-executed commands instead of traditional exploit-based delivery to establish initial access.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence9

Talos observed weaponized installers for applications including MobaXterm, Cisco WebEx, Zoom, DBeaver Community Edition, and FACEIT.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The RAT establishes persistence using scheduled tasks and Startup folder shortcuts while performing anti-analysis checks against common sandbox usernames and hostnames before initiating malicious activity.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

Persistence is established through a randomized scheduled task named PythonLauncher followed by three characters with an AtLogOn trigger...

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

the VBScript establishes persistence under “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” with the generic value “MyApp”

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

pointing back to “mshta.exe” to execute the remotely hosted weaponized HTA file every time the victim logs in to the machine.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence6

The RAT establishes persistence using scheduled tasks and Startup folder shortcuts while performing anti-analysis checks against common sandbox usernames and hostnames before initiating malicious activity.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

Persistence follows through a scheduled task and a startup shortcut.

Privilege Escalation

9 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The RAT establishes persistence using scheduled tasks and Startup folder shortcuts while performing anti-analysis checks against common sandbox usernames and hostnames before initiating malicious activity.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

Persistence is established through a randomized scheduled task named PythonLauncher followed by three characters with an AtLogOn trigger...

T1055Process InjectionEvidence5

After registration, the RAT polls its C2 server approximately every 50 to 60 seconds and supports execution of shell commands, process injection of both 32-bit and 64-bit shellcode, and delivery of additional executable payloads.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence2

Receives a 64-bit shellcode URL and executes the shellcode that is staged using the asynchronous procedure call (APC), process injection technique.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

pointing back to “mshta.exe” to execute the remotely hosted weaponized HTA file every time the victim logs in to the machine.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence6

The RAT establishes persistence using scheduled tasks and Startup folder shortcuts while performing anti-analysis checks against common sandbox usernames and hostnames before initiating malicious activity.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

Persistence follows through a scheduled task and a startup shortcut.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

and tries to increase its privileges

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence2

If the RAT is not already running with elevated privileges, it also attempts UAC elevation via ShellExecuteW with the runas verb.

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

451ac8ca34d5bcdfe476465f69eb517b2608f267c7e8d69f8ef36197a6f1d949 Stage-1-obfuscated-1.ps1 365024336c7681ac0854321ac6c140a245b9593285da02d2a590124cdc592370 Stage-1-obfuscated-2.ps1 a080b5380ccc8fc40b24c02151d305efc32d931dc547881e01a2e6f2b070c7dc Stage-1-obfuscated-3.ps1

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

The campaign uses ClickFix social engineering and trojanized software installers mimicking popular tools such as MobaXterm, WebEx, Zoom, and DBeaverCommunity to deliver a multi-stage infection chain.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence5

After registration, the RAT polls its C2 server approximately every 50 to 60 seconds and supports execution of shell commands, process injection of both 32-bit and 64-bit shellcode, and delivery of additional executable payloads.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence2

Receives a 64-bit shellcode URL and executes the shellcode that is staged using the asynchronous procedure call (APC), process injection technique.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Delivered through an obfuscated PowerShell stager, WLDR operates entirely in memory... WLDR provides operators with an interactive PowerShell-based post-exploitation framework capable of executing additional scripts entirely in memory.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

saves it as a PNG in the RAT’s working directory, generates a Base64-encoded string for the PNG file in memory... and deletes the PNG file from the disk.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

The installer drops a Python loader disguised as a LICENSE.txt file, which XOR-decrypts (key 0xC6) and reflectively executes Starland RAT entirely in memory...

T1218.005MshtaEvidence7

The infection chain begins when a victim is directed via ClickFix lures to execute a command that downloads and launches a weaponized HTA file through mshta.exe.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence6

The RAT establishes persistence using scheduled tasks and Startup folder shortcuts while performing anti-analysis checks against common sandbox usernames and hostnames before initiating malicious activity.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

At startup, Starland RAT performs sandbox evasion by comparing system usernames and hostnames against known analysis environments... and verifies the presence of Zone.Identifier alternate data stream markers.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The installer drops a Python loader disguised as a LICENSE.txt file, which XOR-decrypts (key 0xC6) and reflectively executes Starland RAT entirely in memory to minimize on-disk artifacts.

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

The group gains initial access through social engineering tactics, tricking users into executing a command that downloads a weaponized HTA file

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

the VBScript establishes persistence under “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” with the generic value “MyApp”

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

Both tools are designed to exfiltrate credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet assets

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence8

It also grabs browser credentials, takes a screenshot, and profiles the host.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Both are built to steal credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet assets while keeping persistent access to victim machines.

Discovery

9 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence1

Starland RAT performs extensive host reconnaissance, collecting hardware identifiers, operating system details, Active Directory information, installed antivirus products, desktop screenshots, and the presence of more than 40 cryptocurrency wallet applications and browser extensions.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence2

Starland RAT performs extensive host reconnaissance, collecting hardware identifiers, operating system details, Active Directory information, installed antivirus products, desktop screenshots, and the presence of more than 40 cryptocurrency wallet applications and browser extensions.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

If the victim is identified as a member of Active Directory, the RAT executes the following commands to collect information ... whoami && systeminfo ... For workgroup-only hosts, it executes the whoami /all command.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence7

Starland RAT performs extensive host reconnaissance, collecting hardware identifiers, operating system details, Active Directory information, installed antivirus products, desktop screenshots, and the presence of more than 40 cryptocurrency wallet applications and browser extensions.

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence3

If the machine is domain-joined, it executes whoami, systeminfo, net user, and nltest to map the domain structure.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence4

It then collects extensive host reconnaissance including ... Active Directory membership and domain privilege status...

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence6

The RAT establishes persistence using scheduled tasks and Startup folder shortcuts while performing anti-analysis checks against common sandbox usernames and hostnames before initiating malicious activity.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

At startup, Starland RAT performs sandbox evasion by comparing system usernames and hostnames against known analysis environments... and verifies the presence of Zone.Identifier alternate data stream markers.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Additionally, it gathers the victim’s cryptocurrency assets information by enumerating the desktop cryptocurrency wallets and browser extension wallets, checking for the presence of over 40 cryptocurrency wallets.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

The campaign deploys the Starland RAT and the WLDR PowerShell-based memory implant to steal credentials and cryptocurrency wallet data

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence7

Starland RAT performs extensive host reconnaissance, collecting hardware identifiers, operating system details, Active Directory information, installed antivirus products, desktop screenshots, and the presence of more than 40 cryptocurrency wallet applications and browser extensions.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

2751281d3800d82ecd3fad7c1d2293f3b947875a343b0672b4f4024a261165d2 Plugins.7z

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence5

If the primary C2 infrastructure becomes unavailable, the malware retrieves a fallback domain from a Polygon blockchain smart contract, providing a resilient fallback communication mechanism.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence6

Two Telegram bots receive victim fingerprints and wallet inventories.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

This telemetry is transmitted via HTTP POST with XOR and Base64 encoding to primary C2 domains, with polling every 50 to 60 seconds.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

It can run shell commands, inject 32-bit or 64-bit shellcode, or download more files. A 64-bit path drops CastleStealer, while a 32-bit path drops Remcos RAT.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The first of these is a Python-based remote access tool

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

The actor even stashed a fallback C2 domain inside a Polygon smart contract, which the malware reads through a public blockchain call.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

while maintaining persistent access through encrypted C2 communications

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

The collected information is encrypted and transmitted to attacker-controlled infrastructure to register the compromised host.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

54 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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polyswarmNews · Aug 3, 2026ClickFix-Themed Campaign Deploys Starland RAT and WLDR FrameworkA custom Python-based remote access trojan used to establish persistence, perform anti-analysis checks, conduct host reconnaissance, harvest cryptocurrency wallet and browser-related data, communicate with C2 infrastructure including blockchain-based fallback discovery, execute shell commands, inject shellcode, and deliver additional payloads.Read more ↗security online infoNews · Jul 22, 2026Starland RAT: Russian Actor UAT-11795 Hits Crypto UsersA Python-based remote access trojan delivered via trojanized installers for trusted software. It runs in memory, steals browser credentials, screenshots, host profiling data, and inventories more than 40 cryptocurrency wallets. It also enables shell command execution, shellcode injection, and downloading of additional payloads.Read more ↗splunk researchNews · Jul 20, 2026Analytics Story: Starland RAT Campaign | Splunk Security ContentA novel Python-based remote access trojan that provides persistent remote access, cryptocurrency wallet enumeration, screenshot capture, shellcode injection, host reconnaissance, sandbox evasion, and resilient C2 via primary domains with a Polygon smart-contract-based fallback.Read more ↗scworldNews · Jul 17, 2026New Russian-speaking threat actor UAT-11795 targets US and Europe with novel malware | brief | SC MediaA Python-based remote access trojan used to exfiltrate credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet assets while establishing persistent access.Read more ↗
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IOC matching54Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping50Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.