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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

WLDR agent

Tracked since Jul 16, 2026 · Updated 15 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Post exploitationReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

WLDR Agent is a memory-resident PowerShell backdoor used by UAT-11795, a financially motivated, Russian-speaking threat actor. It targets Windows systems and provides encrypted command-and-control, host reconnaissance, and remote execution of PowerShell commands, scripts, and additional payloads. It has been deployed alongside Starland RAT in a campaign active since at least June 2025, primarily affecting users in the United States and Europe.

WLDR Agent executes entirely in memory and implements task queuing through a PowerShell RunspacePool supporting up to ten concurrent threads. It polls its command-and-control infrastructure approximately every ten seconds, supports reconnection, and uses a mutex to prevent duplicate instances. Communications are protected with AES-256-CBC encryption, HMAC-SHA256 authentication, and PBKDF2-SHA256-derived session keys.

Observed deployment begins with Starland RAT launching a PowerShell stager, followed by a downloader that retrieves and decrypts the agent for in-memory execution. The downloader uses a hardware identifier derived from the system volume serial number to support victim-specific tasking. The broader campaign distributes trojanized installers impersonating legitimate communications, database, and administration software and pursues credential and cryptocurrency theft. Those theft objectives characterize the operation; WLDR Agent’s established role is remote task execution and post-compromise access.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAT-11795

UAT-11795 uses a command-and-control (C2) memory implant named the WLDR Agent.

via riskyrisky.biz
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

7 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistence follows through a scheduled task and a startup shortcut.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

At the operator discretion, Starland RAT deploys the WLDR Agent by executing an embedded PowerShell script...

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

At the operator discretion, Starland RAT deploys the WLDR Agent by executing an embedded PowerShell script... WLDR runs a PowerShell RunspacePool of up to ten concurrent threads...

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

This runs an embedded VBScript that drops a Windows batch file into the user profile’s application temporary folder

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

This runs an embedded VBScript that drops a Windows batch file into the user profile’s application temporary folder

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

The campaign uses ClickFix social engineering and trojanized software installers mimicking popular tools such as MobaXterm, WebEx, Zoom, and DBeaverCommunity to deliver a multi-stage infection chain.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

The infection chain begins when a victim is directed via ClickFix lures to execute a command that downloads and launches a weaponized HTA file through mshta.exe.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistence follows through a scheduled task and a startup shortcut.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistence follows through a scheduled task and a startup shortcut.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The PowerShell stager is heavily obfuscated... The compiled Python loader is a relatively large file obfuscated with numerous junk functions... implementing XOR decryption

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The installer drops a Python loader disguised as a LICENSE.txt file, which XOR-decrypts (key 0xC6) and reflectively executes Starland RAT entirely in memory...

T1218.005MshtaEvidence3

The infection chain begins when a victim is directed via ClickFix lures to execute a command that downloads and launches a weaponized HTA file through mshta.exe.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The loader decrypts Starland RAT and runs it in memory.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Both are built to steal credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet assets

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

uses trojanized installers for legitimate software such as MobaXterm, WebEx, Zoom, DBeaver, and FaceIT to steal credentials and cryptocurrency

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Both are built to steal credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet assets while keeping persistent access to victim machines.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

It also grabs browser credentials, takes a screenshot, and profiles the host.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence2

The RAT also conducts Active Directory reconnaissance via the PowerShell command Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem.Domain.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Additionally, it gathers the victim’s cryptocurrency assets information by enumerating the desktop cryptocurrency wallets and browser extension wallets, checking for the presence of over 40 cryptocurrency wallets.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Two Telegram bots receive victim fingerprints and wallet inventories.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

This telemetry is transmitted via HTTP POST with XOR and Base64 encoding to primary C2 domains, with polling every 50 to 60 seconds.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

containing instructions to first download and implant a trojanized installer from the attacker-controlled staging domain onto the victim machine

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The actor even stashed a fallback C2 domain inside a Polygon smart contract, which the malware reads through a public blockchain call.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence3

It uses encrypted beaconing and a Runspace engine that runs tasks across up to ten threads.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

The RAT consolidates all collected data into a single JSON file... and sends it to the primary C2 through an HTTP POST request.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.