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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

WLDR

Tracked since Jul 16, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs53Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
ClickfixCracked softwareLure
Platforms
Windows

WLDR is a PowerShell-based in-memory command-and-control implant used by the financially motivated, Russian-speaking threat actor UAT-11795 in campaigns active since at least June 2025. It has been observed primarily against victims in the United States, with additional activity affecting Germany, Romania, and Venezuela, and is associated with operations targeting the cryptocurrency sector.

WLDR is delivered through an obfuscated PowerShell stager as part of a multi-stage intrusion chain that also uses trojanized installers for legitimate software and ClickFix-style social engineering. The implant operates entirely in memory and is designed for post-compromise access rather than standalone initial infection. Its architecture supports encrypted beaconing, modular task delivery, concurrent PowerShell Runspace execution, interactive in-memory script execution, and resilient reconnection behavior. Observed implementations used strong encrypted communications and victim-specific payload delivery tied to host identifiers.

In this campaign, WLDR functioned alongside Starland RAT and additional payloads such as CastleStealer and Remcos RAT. It contributed to credential theft and cryptocurrency wallet data theft while helping operators maintain persistent access through ongoing encrypted command-and-control. The broader intrusion set also featured defense-evasion measures including in-memory execution and PowerShell abuse, enabling long-term access and flexible post-exploitation on compromised Windows systems.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAT-11795

The WLDR framework represents one of the campaign's more advanced capabilities. Delivered through an obfuscated PowerShell stager, WLDR operates entirely in memory and supports encrypted communications, concurrent PowerShell Runspace execution, modular task delivery, and robust reconnection logic.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

employing trojanized installers for legitimate software to steal credentials and cryptocurrency

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

This arrives in three stages: a heavily obfuscated PowerShell stager, a downloader that fetches victim-specific payloads bound to the machine’s hardware ID, and the WLDR agent itself

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

the PowerShell-based WLDR agent, which operates entirely in-memory with encrypted beaconing and a Runspace execution engine

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

47dedb08385449d48d8b6543030310317c92cddafa25e14ee0cb9a32d53ced5c Python_Loader.py

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Initial access appears to come through a ClickFix social engineering technique, where the victim is tricked into running a command that downloads and executes a malicious HTA file silently.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

tricking users into executing a command that downloads a weaponized HTA file

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

That HTA file drops a Windows batch file and a trojanized installer, while simultaneously establishing persistence through a registry Run key that re-executes the HTA every time the user logs in.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

That HTA file drops a Windows batch file and a trojanized installer, while simultaneously establishing persistence through a registry Run key that re-executes the HTA every time the user logs in.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

451ac8ca34d5bcdfe476465f69eb517b2608f267c7e8d69f8ef36197a6f1d949 Stage-1-obfuscated-1.ps1 365024336c7681ac0854321ac6c140a245b9593285da02d2a590124cdc592370 Stage-1-obfuscated-2.ps1 a080b5380ccc8fc40b24c02151d305efc32d931dc547881e01a2e6f2b070c7dc Stage-1-obfuscated-3.ps1

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

6ca7a458985350ac082a9c9820d7f8d39128a4c4bda2f5d32f169a45b7b22bc6 MobaXterm_v26.1.exe ... 6ae334ce60d1a9b7fb96d1d0d0eda5ec7c2c31d3f0cf3e4d7e3056504d50043d WebEx_Client.exe ... 1a01ad25712d306f27f526332fdccf959f2de53207b54e4e80f60faa804d6cb6 FaceitInstaller_x64.exe ... f4491736743a16f1278b8ba01649ee93343764e35ae5e1c0d5e0c0e1d7e32c14 Zoom Installer

T1218.005MshtaEvidence2

the victim is tricked into running a command that downloads and executes a malicious HTA file silently.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence3

WLDR agent, which operates entirely in-memory

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

The group gains initial access through social engineering tactics, tricking users into executing a command that downloads a weaponized HTA file

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Both tools are designed to exfiltrate credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet assets

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Both tools are designed to exfiltrate credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet assets

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It then runs reconnaissance: hardware ID derived from the C: drive volume serial number, total RAM, installed antivirus, and Active Directory membership.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The campaign deploys the Starland RAT and the WLDR PowerShell-based memory implant to steal credentials and cryptocurrency wallet data

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

2751281d3800d82ecd3fad7c1d2293f3b947875a343b0672b4f4024a261165d2 Plugins.7z

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Cisco Talos reported that the group even hides a fallback command-and-control channel within a Polygon smart contract

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

When Starland receives a shellexecute command from the C2, the actor can use it to deploy the WLDR framework. This arrives in three stages: a heavily obfuscated PowerShell stager, a downloader that fetches victim-specific payloads

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

operates entirely in-memory with encrypted beaconing

Indicators of compromise

Observables

53 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching53Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.