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Malware1 associated actor

ThumbcacheService

Tracked since Jul 16, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TetrisPhantom

A malicious service called ThumbcacheService then collects files. It targets Office documents and PDFs, archives them with 7-Zip under a set password, and even watches the Recycle Bin.

via security online infosecurityonline.info
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

TmcLoader is a stealthy C++ loader module registered as a Windows service.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

TmcLoader is a stealthy C++ loader module registered as a Windows service.

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

This malware receives encrypted and base64-encoded command-line arguments... ThumbcacheService employs XOR encryption... TmcLoader employs dynamic API resolution through a circular XOR encryption... combined with Base64 encoding for string obfuscation.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Meanwhile, credential dumpers pull secrets from LSASS memory and the SAM hive.

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

Meanwhile, credential dumpers pull secrets from LSASS memory and the SAM hive.

T1003.002Security Account ManagerEvidence1

Meanwhile, credential dumpers pull secrets from LSASS memory and the SAM hive.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

It specifically targets documents with the following extensions... The malicious service also monitors the $Recycle.Bin directory for deleted files with the extensions of interest.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

A malicious service called ThumbcacheService then collects files. It targets Office documents and PDFs, archives them with 7-Zip under a set password, and even watches the Recycle Bin.

T1039Data from Network Shared DriveEvidence2

Stolen credentials from phase one make that quiet, share-based transfer possible.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

The malicious service also monitors the $Recycle.Bin directory for deleted files with the extensions of interest, ensuring comprehensive data collection.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence3

A malicious service called ThumbcacheService then collects files. It targets Office documents and PDFs, archives them with 7-Zip under a set password, and even watches the Recycle Bin.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

After several days, it pulls in helper tools.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1011Exfiltration Over Other Network MediumEvidence1

TmcPayload reads a config file holding network-share credentials and destinations. It then ships out the exact database that ThumbcacheService built.

T1029Scheduled TransferEvidence1

After the initial phase of the malware deployments, the attackers allowed a few weeks for the ThumbcacheService to silently collect sensitive files without exfiltrating them.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.