Malware

perfgurd.dll

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

The recovered byte array is then passed directly to Assembly.Load(), causing the hidden .NET assembly to be loaded entirely from memory without being written to disk.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

These decoded strings are subsequently used by the second-stage assembly as command or operation identifiers... perform an injection-related operation (inj).

Stealth

5 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Although the function contains a large amount of obfuscating junk code...

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The author hides it inside the image by encoding the payload bytes into the RGB values of the bitmap’s pixels.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

These decoded strings are subsequently used by the second-stage assembly as command or operation identifiers... perform an injection-related operation (inj).

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The extracted payload is processed through a custom XOR-based decryption routine... After decryption, the payload is reconstructed directly in memory.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The recovered byte array is then passed directly to Assembly.Load(), causing the hidden .NET assembly to be loaded entirely from memory without being written to disk.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

seqriteNews

Jul 17, 2026

Behind the Refund: From GST Phishing to Remcos RAT Through a Multi-Stage .NET Infection Chain | Seqrite

A third-stage in-memory .NET loader that uses architecture-dependent reflective invocation, checks for admin privileges, abuses cmstp.exe for elevation, establishes persistence via Run key and PowerShell, and decrypts/reconstructs the final Remcos RAT payload in memory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

perfgurd.dll

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

The recovered byte array is then passed directly to Assembly.Load(), causing the hidden .NET assembly to be loaded entirely from memory without being written to disk.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

These decoded strings are subsequently used by the second-stage assembly as command or operation identifiers... perform an injection-related operation (inj).

Stealth

5 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Although the function contains a large amount of obfuscating junk code...

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The author hides it inside the image by encoding the payload bytes into the RGB values of the bitmap’s pixels.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

These decoded strings are subsequently used by the second-stage assembly as command or operation identifiers... perform an injection-related operation (inj).

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The extracted payload is processed through a custom XOR-based decryption routine... After decryption, the payload is reconstructed directly in memory.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The recovered byte array is then passed directly to Assembly.Load(), causing the hidden .NET assembly to be loaded entirely from memory without being written to disk.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

seqriteNews

Jul 17, 2026

Behind the Refund: From GST Phishing to Remcos RAT Through a Multi-Stage .NET Infection Chain | Seqrite

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.