Malware

Worm:Win32/Renamer.A!MSR

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Should I scan USB drives? Yes. A worm-labeled detection and many executable alerts make removable drives part of the investigation. Scan them before opening files from them, and avoid running portable apps or copied installers from those drives until cleanup is complete.

Execution

1 technique

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

inspect the common places that can restart malware after a scan: Task Scheduler Library for unknown tasks that run executables from %APPDATA% , %TEMP% , Downloads, or a removable drive.

Persistence

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

inspect the common places that can restart malware after a scan: Task Scheduler Library for unknown tasks that run executables from %APPDATA% , %TEMP% , Downloads, or a removable drive.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for unfamiliar startup values. Startup folders under %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup and %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup .

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

inspect the common places that can restart malware after a scan: Task Scheduler Library for unknown tasks that run executables from %APPDATA% , %TEMP% , Downloads, or a removable drive.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Stealth

1 technique

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

This detection is easy to mishandle because it can appear across many normal-looking .exe files.

Lateral Movement

1 technique

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

trojan killer newsNews

Aug 9, 2026

Worm:Win32/Renamer.A!MSR Removal and EXE Repair

A severe Microsoft Defender worm detection associated with repeated detections across executable files, possible file replacement or copied payloads, and potential reinfection via startup locations, removable drives, or shared drives. The content emphasizes quarantine, full and offline scanning, persistence checks, and scanning USB media.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

Worm:Win32/Renamer.A!MSR

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Execution

1 technique

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

inspect the common places that can restart malware after a scan: Task Scheduler Library for unknown tasks that run executables from %APPDATA% , %TEMP% , Downloads, or a removable drive.

Persistence

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

inspect the common places that can restart malware after a scan: Task Scheduler Library for unknown tasks that run executables from %APPDATA% , %TEMP% , Downloads, or a removable drive.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

inspect the common places that can restart malware after a scan: Task Scheduler Library for unknown tasks that run executables from %APPDATA% , %TEMP% , Downloads, or a removable drive.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Stealth

1 technique

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

This detection is easy to mishandle because it can appear across many normal-looking .exe files.

Lateral Movement

1 technique

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

trojan killer newsNews

Aug 9, 2026

Worm:Win32/Renamer.A!MSR Removal and EXE Repair

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.