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Malware1 associated actor

XG-Web

Tracked since Aug 13, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs28Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Jewelbug

“XG-Web: a three-tier browser-centric C&C (React panel, Node.js backend, MySQL), with hybrid RSA-2048/AES-256 transport over WebSocket Secure with HTTP long-poll fallback.”

via symantec blogsed-cms.broadcom.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

In its largest operation, a single planted script placed a watering-hole on more than 15 government webmail tenants in a Middle Eastern country at once.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

The researchers explained that the threat actor obtained write access to the webmail installation used by multiple government ministries and agencies after compromising a shared web-hosting platform operated by the state telecommunications provider and national services agency.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

It communicated with a Windows helper called com.microsoft.runedge, masquerading as an Edge component, to run commands on the device.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

An operator could invoke any Chrome or Firefox function on the victim's behalf by name, inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript on any page.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence1

The group's primary implant was a malicious browser extension named “PDF Viewer”, which was built to run in both Chrome and Firefox.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

For delivery, the framework served a freshly obfuscated payload on every request. This was XOR encoded with a random key so no two downloads were identical.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

"The C&C hostnames are disguised to mimic common resources such as Google Fonts." and "under the misleading name com.microsoft.runedge"

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

"The extension grants the ability to... harvest credentials by hooking login forms, cookies..." and "the malicious code activating on the login page and every mailbox view to exfiltrate cookies over a WebSocket connection"

Collection

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence2

Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks... | At the centre of the activity is XG-Web, a browser-focused control system that lets operators remotely direct an infected browser.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

"Both missions are administered from a single control panel, XG-Web, a browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing framework that turns a victim's browser into a full remote-control channel..."

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

When a ministry staff member logged in, the script opened a WebSocket to the C&C, completed the cryptographic handshake and reported in.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

Once running, Antino uses the Microsoft Graph API as its C&C channel, hiding its traffic inside legitimate Microsoft cloud services... the backend created a public Google Document, wrote an obfuscated payload into the body, and had implants fetch the documents and execute the payloads.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

When the victim clicked to update, the browser downloaded the second-stage executable from a group-controlled domain... The downloaded executable was the group's Antino backdoor.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The script established a WebSocket connection to the attacker's command-and-control (C2) server, exfiltrated webmail cookies

Indicators of compromise

Observables

28 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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gurucul threat researchNews · Aug 25, 2026Jewelbug: APT Group Runs Espionage and Crypto Fraud Operations Side by Side | Community Portal | GuruculRemote-access framework used by Jewelbug in parallel cyberespionage and cryptocurrency fraud operations across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. It forms part of a toolkit used for data theft and sustained access to victim networks; the reference does not detail its individual capabilities.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Aug 14, 2026China-Linked Jewelbug Uses XG-Web for Government Espionage and Crypto FraudA browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing framework that turns a victim's browser into a remote-control channel, steals credentials and browser data, retrieves obfuscated payloads, and supports broader host and internal network access via associated implants.Read more ↗bleeping computerNews · Aug 13, 2026Hackers breach govt webmail while running parallel crypto fraudA remote-access and data-theft framework used by Jewelbug to manage campaigns and victim information.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Aug 13, 2026Jewelbug APT Hijacks Browsers to Steal Cookies and Spy on Government NetworksA browser-focused control system used to remotely control infected browsers via a malicious Chrome/Firefox extension. It can read cookies, monitor session tokens, inspect history and bookmarks, take screenshots, capture clipboard contents, inject code into websites, and intercept browser traffic.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching28Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.