XG-Web
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“XG-Web: a three-tier browser-centric C&C (React panel, Node.js backend, MySQL), with hybrid RSA-2048/AES-256 transport over WebSocket Secure with HTTP long-poll fallback.”
Techniques & procedures
18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
In its largest operation, a single planted script placed a watering-hole on more than 15 government webmail tenants in a Middle Eastern country at once.
The researchers explained that the threat actor obtained write access to the webmail installation used by multiple government ministries and agencies after compromising a shared web-hosting platform operated by the state telecommunications provider and national services agency.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
It communicated with a Windows helper called com.microsoft.runedge, masquerading as an Edge component, to run commands on the device.
An operator could invoke any Chrome or Firefox function on the victim's behalf by name, inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript on any page.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
The group's primary implant was a malicious browser extension named “PDF Viewer”, which was built to run in both Chrome and Firefox.
The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
For delivery, the framework served a freshly obfuscated payload on every request. This was XOR encoded with a random key so no two downloads were identical.
"The C&C hostnames are disguised to mimic common resources such as Google Fonts." and "under the misleading name com.microsoft.runedge"
The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.
"The extension grants the ability to... harvest credentials by hooking login forms, cookies..." and "the malicious code activating on the login page and every mailbox view to exfiltrate cookies over a WebSocket connection"
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.
Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.
Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.
Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks... | At the centre of the activity is XG-Web, a browser-focused control system that lets operators remotely direct an infected browser.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
"Both missions are administered from a single control panel, XG-Web, a browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing framework that turns a victim's browser into a full remote-control channel..."
When a ministry staff member logged in, the script opened a WebSocket to the C&C, completed the cryptographic handshake and reported in.
Once running, Antino uses the Microsoft Graph API as its C&C channel, hiding its traffic inside legitimate Microsoft cloud services... the backend created a public Google Document, wrote an obfuscated payload into the body, and had implants fetch the documents and execute the payloads.
When the victim clicked to update, the browser downloaded the second-stage executable from a group-controlled domain... The downloaded executable was the group's Antino backdoor.
The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The script established a WebSocket connection to the attacker's command-and-control (C2) server, exfiltrated webmail cookies
Observables
28 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.