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Mallory
Malware

SilentMare

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs67Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

We are documenting two malware families, SilentMare and HollowMare, that are spreading via Trojanized utility applications such as PDF converters and ZIP tools.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The updater is executed, usually once a day, via a scheduled task that was created by the installer.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

filepath %LOCALAPPDATA%\ConvertMate\conmate_update.ps1 PowerShell script temporarily dropped by ConvertMate installer

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The updater is executed, usually once a day, via a scheduled task that was created by the installer.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The updater is executed, usually once a day, via a scheduled task that was created by the installer.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Both families are delivered via custom installers that create desktop shortcuts, register an uninstaller, time-stomp the PE timestamp, and obfuscate strings to hide their activity from static analyzers.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The payload is encrypted with AES, and the updater expects it to be a .NET file. The decrypted payload is executed directly from memory without writing anything to disk.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

Both families are delivered via custom installers that create desktop shortcuts, register an uninstaller, time-stomp the PE timestamp, and obfuscate strings to hide their activity from static analyzers.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The installer tries to run with administrator permission, by re-launching and prompting the users for UAC, so it can install into %APPDATA% instead of %LOCALAPPDATA%.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The decrypted payload is executed directly from memory without writing anything to disk.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Instead, these applications are simple web clients that upload the files to a server for conversion.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The updater checks in with its C2 to see if a payload is available to be executed. If it gets an authorization token, it downloads the payload from the same C2 server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

A big change with the installer in this era is that they do not contain the SilentMare component. Instead, the updater component is downloaded by the installer.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Telemetry is collected at multiple steps as part of its operation, including by the updater.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

67 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching67Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.