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Mallory
Malware

HollowMare

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs52Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

We are documenting two malware families, SilentMare and HollowMare, that are spreading via Trojanized utility applications such as PDF converters and ZIP tools.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Both families are delivered via custom installers that create desktop shortcuts, register an uninstaller, time-stomp the PE timestamp, and obfuscate strings to hide their activity from static analyzers.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The payload is encrypted with AES, and the updater expects it to be a .NET file. The decrypted payload is executed directly from memory without writing anything to disk.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

Both families are delivered via custom installers that create desktop shortcuts, register an uninstaller, time-stomp the PE timestamp, and obfuscate strings to hide their activity from static analyzers.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Using virtual keyboard messages sent to the browser window, the installer navigates to the extensions installation page and installs the extension as if the user had done so manually.

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Using virtual keyboard messages sent to the browser window, the installer navigates to the extensions installation page and installs the extension as if the user had done so manually.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

HollowMare uses two techniques to modify the browser: driving the browser window with synthetic keystrokes, or overwriting a file in the browser’s profile folder with a version provided by the C2 server.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The updater checks in with its C2 to see if a payload is available to be executed. If it gets an authorization token, it downloads the payload from the same C2 server.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Telemetry is collected at multiple steps as part of its operation, including by the updater.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

52 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching52Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.