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Malware2 associated actors3 associated CVEs

Emdivi

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingWatering holeDrive by
Platforms
Windows

Emdivi is a Windows HTTP backdoor used in targeted cyber-espionage operations against Japanese organizations. It has been closely associated with the Blue Termite threat actor, also referred to as Cloudy Omega, and was active in campaigns targeting government agencies, local governments, universities, financial institutions, energy, media, healthcare, manufacturing, transportation, and other sectors in Japan. Emdivi was notably deployed in attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in Japanese software such as Ichitaro, and later appeared in watering-hole and drive-by compromise chains using Adobe Flash exploitation.

The malware family is versioned in a structured manner, with observed variants including t17, t19, and t20. Emdivi t17 served as an infection-stage backdoor, while later tailored t20 variants provided a substantially expanded command set for post-compromise operations. Reported samples ranged from a small set of backdoor commands in earlier variants to dozens of commands in later ones, indicating ongoing development and operational refinement.

Emdivi communicates over HTTP and stores key configuration elements in encrypted form. Protected data has included command-and-control settings, API names, anti-analysis strings, mutex values, command identifiers, and proxy configuration. Some variants derived decryption material from the victim system’s Security Identifier, effectively binding the implant to an intended host and complicating analysis and reuse. Later samples added stronger cryptographic protections, including AES, to further hinder reverse engineering.

Observed delivery vectors include spearphishing with exploit documents targeting Ichitaro vulnerabilities, as well as watering-hole and drive-by-download attacks that delivered Emdivi through browser or plugin exploitation. In the Blue Termite intrusion chain, Emdivi functioned as a backdoor after initial compromise and supported sustained access to victim environments. Its use in highly tailored Japan-focused espionage activity, together with victim-specific configuration such as internal proxy settings, indicates deliberate customization for enterprise environments and long-term intelligence collection.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2014-7247via virusbulletinExploited in the wildStack-based buffer overflow in JustSystems IchitaroCVE-2014-7247 was exploited as a zero-day vulnerability. The attack was carried out through targeted emails which were distributed to government agencies and enterprises in Japan. | Emdivi is a bot that communicates via HTTP protocol. The malware versions are managed systematically by the developer, and there are occasional functional updates.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2011-3544via virusbulletinExploited in the wildOracle Java Rhino Script Engine Sandbox Bypass and Remote Code ExecutionIn 2013, a compromised website was found embedded with a Java Applet which leverages a Java vulnerability (CVE-2011-3544), resulting in Emdivi being downloaded to visitors’ devices. | Emdivi is a bot that communicates via HTTP protocol. The malware versions are managed systematically by the developer, and there are occasional functional updates.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-5119via securelistAdobe Flash Player AS3 ByteArray Use-After-FreeThe extracted executable file is “emdivi t17”, a new infection vector used by the attackers... Kaspersky Lab detected the tailored malware, “emdivi t20”. This malware is basically used after the infection by emdivi t17 that serves as a backdoor.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Cloudy Omega

Emdivi is a bot that communicates via HTTP protocol. The malware versions are managed systematically by the developer, and there are occasional functional updates.

via virusbulletinvirusbulletin.com
Blue Termite

Emdivi is a bot that communicates via HTTP protocol. The malware versions are managed systematically by the developer, and there are occasional functional updates.

via virusbulletinvirusbulletin.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

BRONZE BUTLER used watering hole attacks (e.g. Adobe Flash Player zero-day exploit) as its main attack method until 2016... | In 2013, a compromised website was found embedded with a Java Applet which leverages a Java vulnerability (CVE-2011-3544), resulting in Emdivi being downloaded to visitors’ devices (a drive-by download attack).

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The APT group delivered the zero-day exploit code via a spear-phishing email sent to Japanese government agencies... the email contained a new year greeting and a decoy document with the zero-day exploit attached.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

they copied malware to other devices and registered the task to execute it... Other commands used were ‘at’ and ‘schtacks’ to register tasks

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The Sanshiro series contains a vulnerability that allows arbitrary code execution (CVE-2014-0810)... This vulnerability was leveraged to embed shellcode in the Sanshiro document. In the case of the APT attack, the shellcode was then executed through the exploit.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

they copied malware to other devices and registered the task to execute it... Other commands used were ‘at’ and ‘schtacks’ to register tasks

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

they copied malware to other devices and registered the task to execute it... Other commands used were ‘at’ and ‘schtacks’ to register tasks

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence1

t17 contains about 10 commands, which perform file download/upload and event log deletion.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Emdivi is a bot that communicates via HTTP protocol... Agtid is a bot that communicates via HTTP protocol.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

When the malware is executed, it downloads Base64-encoded xxmm.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

they compressed it with WinRAR and send it to a C&C server using the Emdivi download command.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.