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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Weaver Ant had maintained persistent access to an internal server for four years using the China Chopper web shell and a newly identified, memory-resident web shell named ‘INMemory’, which supports in-memory execution to evade detection.
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A custom ASPX web shell that loads a hardcoded GZipped Base64-encoded PE ('eval.dll') directly into memory via Assembly.Load, validates request headers using a hardcoded SHA256 comparison, decodes payloads, and executes them dynamically with JScriptEvaluate to avoid disk artifacts and detection.
A newly identified memory-resident web shell/module that supports in-memory execution to evade detection and was used for persistent access in the espionage operation.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.