MalwareUsed by 1 actor

jusched.exe

For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

만약, 이용자가 [콘텐츠 사용] 버튼을 클릭해 매크로가 실행되면, 'Java Update Scheduler' 파일처럼 위장한 악성파일(jusched.exe)과 정상적인 문서가 다음과 같은 경로에 생성되고 몰래 실행됩니다.

via alyac blogblog.alyac.co.kr

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique

T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

The domain contacted is a legitimate website that had been compromised and was being used to host malicious content

Execution

3 techniques

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

MS Word 파일의 내부 OLE 코드구조를 살펴보면, 아래와 같이 매크로 코드가 포함되어 있는 것을 알 수 있으며 ... 'NewMacros' 함수에는 난독화된 매크로 코드들이 포함되어 있습니다.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

해당 공격에서는 DOC, XLS 매크로 공격이 아니라, HWP 취약점을 이용한 감염벡터가 사용되었습니다.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The Microsoft Word document contains malicious macros that are responsible for extracting a malicious PE32 executable called "jusched.exe"

Persistence

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

재부팅시 자동 실행되도록 시작프로그램 경로에 'jusched.lnk' 형태로 등록합니다.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

재부팅시 자동 실행되도록 시작프로그램 경로에 'jusched.lnk' 형태로 등록합니다.

Stealth

3 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The macro is obfuscated: The encoded string is a PE32 executable encoded with the XOR key: 0xe7.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

The APIs are not listed in the import table, but they are loaded dynamically using GetProcAddess(). The function names are obfuscated to make static analysis more difficult.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The malicious document purports to relate to an employment opportunity with Cisco in Korea with the name "Job Descriptions.doc."

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

이 악성코드는 한국의 특정 웹 사이트(secuvision.co.kr)와 통신을 시도하고, 공격자의 추가 명령을 대기하게 됩니다.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The PE32 executable attempts to contact the command and control (C2) server over HTTP

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The PE32 executable attempts to contact the command and control (C2) server over HTTP, presumably to retrieve additional instructions (script or PE32 executable) for execution on the infected system.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

alyac blogNews

Jan 30, 2019

라자루스 APT 조직, 오퍼레이션 익스트림 잡(Operation Extreme Job)으로 공격 수행

A Lazarus-linked malicious payload disguised as Java Update Scheduler. It is dropped by a malicious Word macro, communicates with secuvision.co.kr, and waits for additional attacker commands, functioning as a backdoor.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 1 actor

jusched.exe

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Lazarus

via alyac blogblog.alyac.co.kr

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique

T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

The domain contacted is a legitimate website that had been compromised and was being used to host malicious content

Execution

3 techniques

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

해당 공격에서는 DOC, XLS 매크로 공격이 아니라, HWP 취약점을 이용한 감염벡터가 사용되었습니다.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The Microsoft Word document contains malicious macros that are responsible for extracting a malicious PE32 executable called "jusched.exe"

Persistence

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

재부팅시 자동 실행되도록 시작프로그램 경로에 'jusched.lnk' 형태로 등록합니다.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

재부팅시 자동 실행되도록 시작프로그램 경로에 'jusched.lnk' 형태로 등록합니다.

Stealth

3 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The macro is obfuscated: The encoded string is a PE32 executable encoded with the XOR key: 0xe7.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

The APIs are not listed in the import table, but they are loaded dynamically using GetProcAddess(). The function names are obfuscated to make static analysis more difficult.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The malicious document purports to relate to an employment opportunity with Cisco in Korea with the name "Job Descriptions.doc."

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

이 악성코드는 한국의 특정 웹 사이트(secuvision.co.kr)와 통신을 시도하고, 공격자의 추가 명령을 대기하게 됩니다.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The PE32 executable attempts to contact the command and control (C2) server over HTTP

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The PE32 executable attempts to contact the command and control (C2) server over HTTP, presumably to retrieve additional instructions (script or PE32 executable) for execution on the infected system.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

alyac blogNews

Jan 30, 2019

라자루스 APT 조직, 오퍼레이션 익스트림 잡(Operation Extreme Job)으로 공격 수행

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.