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Mallory
Malware

DELoader

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs37Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Defense evasionProcess injectionPost exploitation
Delivery
MalspamPhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

DELoader is a Windows malware family whose primary role is to load and execute additional payloads on an infected host. It has been observed creating a suspended explorer.exe process, decrypting an embedded DLL from its own body, and injecting that component into the target process. The injected code then retrieves an additional portable executable, validates that it is a PE file, and injects the downloaded payload into explorer.exe using remote-thread-based process injection. This behavior indicates a modular design centered on staging and execution of follow-on malware rather than direct monetization or standalone destructive effects.

DELoader has been associated with financially motivated activity and appears to have been used in campaigns with a notable concentration of victims in Germany and Austria. Reporting has linked its infrastructure and operational overlaps to activity involving domains registered under the same persona previously tied to Zeus-related campaigns and Android Marcher banking malware operations. Those overlaps suggest an operator or cluster of operators with a history of banking-malware distribution and regional targeting of German-speaking users, while some historical activity also extended to Australian banking targets.

Distribution evidence indicates DELoader was delivered through malicious email campaigns, including invoice-themed ZIP archives containing downloader components, and it has also been delivered as a secondary payload by Hancitor. In those observed chains, Hancitor acted as the initial downloader and subsequently installed DELoader alongside other malware families. DELoader therefore fits into broader intrusion ecosystems as an intermediate loader used to establish execution of additional malware on Windows systems.

The malware’s core capabilities include payload retrieval, in-memory loading, and process injection for execution under a legitimate Windows process, all of which support defense evasion and post-compromise staging. Available evidence supports Windows as the relevant platform.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

From the above graph we can extract the infection chain for DELoader, which is delivered through malicious JavaScript downloaders: Since the JavaScript downloaders come from ZIP files with “invoice” themes, it is more or less sent to victims as an attachment to malicious emails.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Since the JavaScript downloaders come from ZIP files with “invoice” themes, it is more or less sent to victims as an attachment to malicious emails.

Execution

1 technique
T1106Native APIEvidence1

it then injects the downloaded file using CreateRemoteThread API

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It does this by initially creating a suspended explorer.exe process: It then proceeds to decrypt an embedded DLL from its body and inject it into explorer.exe

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

It does this by initially creating a suspended explorer.exe process

Stealth

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It does this by initially creating a suspended explorer.exe process: It then proceeds to decrypt an embedded DLL from its body and inject it into explorer.exe

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

It does this by initially creating a suspended explorer.exe process

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The injected DLL then attempts to download a file from the link hxxp://remembermetoday4.asia/00/b.bin

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

then it started generating DNS queries for random 20-character alphabetic strings with .com as the top level domain (TLD)... This blog post shows how to reverse engineer the algorithm... The seed is based on the unix timestamp for the current date at time 00:00 UTC.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

37 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching37Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.