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Mallory
Malware

BankBotAlpha

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs166Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Once the app is run, the malware takes control and becomes the main activity in the user’s screen, showing a phishing page like the one above, designed to look like the bank’s original page. Once the user inputs their credentials, they are sent to the CC, where they are saved on a database.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The credentials are leaked using a standard HTTP POST request directly to the CC PHP script, located at /private/add_inj.php

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

The first time it is run, the application asks the user to grant it device admin privileges.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The malware sets up a broadcast receiver for SMS in order to handle received messages and extract the information needed from them. Moreover, it is cautious enough to delete SMS from both the “inbox” and “sent” folders.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

After this action, the app hides itself from the main menu, and starts acting in the shadows.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Once the user inputs their credentials, they are sent to the CC, where they are saved on a database.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Once the user inputs their credentials, they are sent to the CC, where they are saved on a database.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence1

The first time it is run, the application asks the user to grant it device admin privileges.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware collects information like IMEI, Bank applications present on the device, OS version, presence of root, etc.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware collects information like IMEI, Bank applications present on the device, OS version, presence of root, etc.

Collection

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Once the user inputs their credentials, they are sent to the CC, where they are saved on a database.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The credentials are leaked using a standard HTTP POST request directly to the CC PHP script, located at /private/add_inj.php ... The malicious apps send heartbeats every few seconds to update their status

Indicators of compromise

Observables

166 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching166Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.