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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

Soul

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs41Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

Soul is a modular Windows espionage malware framework active since at least 2017 and used in cyber-espionage operations targeting government and other strategic sectors in Southeast Asia, including defense, healthcare, and information and communications technology. It has been linked in multiple investigations to Chinese-aligned intrusion activity, including operations associated with the Sharp Panda/Sharp Dragon cluster, although public attribution to a single actor is not definitive.

The framework evolved from an early backdoor that incorporated code derived from Gh0st RAT, NetBot, HTran, DynamiCall, and 7zip-related components into a more mature multi-stage platform centered on the SoulSearcher loader and multiple in-memory modules. Later variants emphasized stealth by storing compressed payloads and configuration data in the Windows registry and reflectively loading modules directly into memory rather than writing them to disk. SoulSearcher variants have used binary, XML, and semicolon-delimited configurations, validated and decompressed embedded or registry-resident payloads, and loaded one or more Soul modules through exported entry points.

Soul provides backdoor and post-compromise functionality through modular components. Observed capabilities include victim fingerprinting, command-and-control over custom HTTP traffic, registry-based persistence and storage, file and shell-related tasking in earlier backdoor generations, proxy functionality, and staged loading of additional command DLLs. Associated modules and configurations indicate support for keylogging, clipboard capture, file monitoring, service installation, and auxiliary collection features. Dedicated keylogger components compiled across multiple years captured keystrokes and clipboard data, including input methods relevant to some Asian-language environments.

Operationally, Soul has appeared in spearphishing-led intrusion chains in which weaponized documents and intermediate downloaders delivered SoulSearcher, which then decrypted and loaded the Soul framework in memory. Newer backdoor variants appear more specialized as orchestration layers for loading follow-on modules rather than directly exposing the full range of operator commands. Across components, recurring traits include import obfuscation, stack strings, shared compression and encryption routines, and closely related development patterns, indicating a maintained malware ecosystem built for long-term espionage and covert post-exploitation on Windows hosts.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SharpPanda

the Soul framework... Sharp Dragon has transitioned from using VictoryDll and the SoulSearcher framework to adopting Cobalt Strike Beacon

via checkpoint blogblog.checkpoint.com
Sharp Dragon

the Soul framework... Sharp Dragon has transitioned from using VictoryDll and the SoulSearcher framework to adopting Cobalt Strike Beacon

via checkpoint blogblog.checkpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1592Gather Victim Host InformationEvidence1

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ID Description T1592 Gather Victim Host Information

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The attackers used spear-phishing emails to gain initial access to the targeted networks. These emails typically contained a Word document with government-themed lures

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

0x23000000 It opens an interactive CMD shell, allowing the attacker to execute CMD commands until terminating the shell by sending the “Exit” command.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ID Description T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the actors performed some variation of IKEEXT DLL Hijacking, when on the start of the IKEEXT service, svchost.exe would load the malicious DLL, saved as wlbsctrl.dll

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Instead of dropping the payload to disk, the compressed module is stored in the registry and is loaded in-memory.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ID Description T1055 Process Injection

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The module is stored as a compressed blob with a custom header in the registry. It is never written to disk.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ID Description T1055 Process Injection

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The configuration contains... <SelfDestroy>2029-07-11 15:29:32</SelfDestroy>

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The dropper LZMA-decompresses the backdoor and a configuration that they both share.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the actors performed some variation of IKEEXT DLL Hijacking, when on the start of the IKEEXT service, svchost.exe would load the malicious DLL, saved as wlbsctrl.dll

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

reflectively load the Soul main module DLL in memory

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Instead of dropping the payload to disk, the compressed module is stored in the registry and is loaded in-memory.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Computer name and information about the current user, such as admin rights retrieved with NetUserGetInfo API

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Receipt of commands begins when the backdoor sends information about the machine to the server with a MessageType of 0x11000000: Hostname, IP address(es), CPU architecture, RAM size

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

0x21000000 File manipulation functions that include moving, copying, deleting, downloading, and/or uploading files.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

the struct is compressed according to the previously described compressed_data struct from SoulSearcher, and then encoded with Base64

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Every request to the server is composed of hardcoded HTTP headers impersonating legitimate network traffic to taboola[.]com.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

Proxy These samples’ configuration indicates proxy capabilities over HTTP and HTTPS, as well as the ability to run CMD commands.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

When one of the five named commands is received, the backdoor downloads and executes a DLL from the server.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

CompressedBuffer is zlib-deflated data.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

the entire C&C communication was based on sending data encrypted using RC4 and encoded with base64

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

In case of a bad or no response, the backdoor attempts to resolve the IP address of the C&C server on its own through the DNS servers in the config

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Affected Platforms: Windows Impacted Users: Windows Users Impact: Collects sensitive information and executes additional malicious modules

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ID Description T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Indicators of compromise

Observables

41 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching41Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.