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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

DRIGO

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 22 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistence
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

DRIGO is a Go-based information-stealing tool used by BlackTech, also known as BRONZE CANAL, in the PLEAD cyberespionage campaign targeting Taiwanese government agencies and private organizations. It searches compromised systems for documents and exfiltrates collected information through Google services. Some variants establish persistence through Windows autorun registry entries.

DRIGO has two observed forms: GDrive Uploader and GSMTP Mailer. GDrive Uploader transfers stolen documents to attacker-controlled Google Drive accounts, obtaining OAuth access tokens through embedded refresh tokens. GSMTP Mailer exfiltrates information through Gmail SMTP using hardcoded sender and recipient addresses and token-based authentication rather than a password. Its Google service communications resemble legitimate API traffic. Some cloud storage accounts used to receive documents stolen by DRIGO have also been used to distribute the PLEAD backdoor.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BlackTech

PLEAD also uses the document-targeting exfiltration tool DRIGO, which mainly searches the infected machine for documents.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
BRONZE CANAL

BRONZE CANAL ... Tools ... Bifrose, Deuterbear, DRIGO, Flagpro, Gh0stTimes, KIVARS, PLEAD, Spiderpig, Waterbear, XBOW

via secureworkssecureworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

While most PLEAD and DRIGO variants utilize autorun registry as a persistence mechanism, some were seen to be installed as a service

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

While most PLEAD and DRIGO variants utilize autorun registry as a persistence mechanism, some were seen to be installed as a service

Credential Access

1 technique
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

This is done by using a refresh token that is almost the equivalent of a user credential and requesting an access token.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

PLEAD’s backdoor can: List drives, processes, open windows, and files

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

PLEAD also uses the document-targeting exfiltration tool DRIGO, which mainly searches the infected machine for documents.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

GSMTP Mailer – Makes use of Gmail SMTP services to exfiltrate information.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

GSMTP Mailer – Makes use of Gmail SMTP services to exfiltrate information.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

DRIGO mainly interacts with Google services, which we’ve seen using HTTPS traffic identical to a normal Google API-generated traffic.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence2

Each copy of DRIGO contains a refresh token tied to specific Gmail accounts used by the attackers, which are in turn linked to a Google Drive account. The stolen files are uploaded to these Google Drives, where the attackers can harvest them.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.