Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware

HookInjEx

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK19Techniques
IOCs134Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

We first encountered a document with the name ... .docx ... The above document leverages the external template technique, allowing it to load a document template from a remote server ... After the victim opens the document and the remote template is downloaded, the malicious macro code in the template executes a batch script which tries to download and execute the next stage payload

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

the malicious macro code in the template executes a batch script which tries to download and execute the next stage payload

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

After the victim opens the document and the remote template is downloaded, the malicious macro code in the template executes a batch script

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Persistence The malware sets the registry key which is in the <Reg> value of the configuration file (which is almost always the key RunOnce )

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

the malware sets the registry key ... almost always the key RunOnce ... In older versions ... was added to RunOnce ... Persistence method by copying the executable ... to %appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\audio-driver.exe

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Persistence The malware sets the registry key which is in the <Reg> value of the configuration file (which is almost always the key RunOnce )

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

the malware sets the registry key ... almost always the key RunOnce ... In older versions ... was added to RunOnce ... Persistence method by copying the executable ... to %appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\audio-driver.exe

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

One of payload’s resources contains encoded configuration data ... Before being uploaded, the data is encrypted using library pyAesCrypt ... strings are encrypted

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Infostealer ... Logs clipboard data ... HookInjEx ... Keylogging and clipboard data from various formats

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Uploads relevant Telegram files from victim’s computer. These files allow the attackers to make full usage of the victim’s Telegram account

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Steals information from KeePass application ... The payload targets two main applications : Telegram Desktop and KeePass

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Opera/Chrome/Firefox login data ... Focused on – Telegram, Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Paltalk NG

Discovery

1 technique
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

the malware uses FTPS with hard-coded credentials ... the user_id is included in the URLs ... value to download using computer-name and username

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Uploads any file it could find which ends with pre-defined extensions ... enumerates any relevant file it can find on the victim’s computer

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence1

Files from removable drivers. The types of files are based on the <cpy> tags

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Infostealer ... Logs clipboard data ... HookInjEx ... Keylogging and clipboard data from various formats

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Logs clipboard data and takes desktop screenshots ... Screenshots and title of the foreground window

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Logs clipboard data ... Keylogging and clipboard data from various formats – drag and drop/ CF_HDROP , CF_TEXT ... CF_BITMAP and CF_DIB

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

records the phone’s voice surroundings ... Initiate a voice recording of the phone’s surroundings ... Waveform-audio recording for a minute

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence1

Uses FTP instead of SOAP for data exfiltration ... communicates with an FTP server using hard-coded credentials

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

the malicious macro code in the template executes a batch script which tries to download and execute the next stage payload ... The program tries fetching updates for its current modules and also download several additional modules

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

Uses FTP instead of SOAP for data exfiltration ... The malware uses FTPS with hard-coded credentials ... uploads files to its C2 domain using the FTP protocol

Indicators of compromise

Observables

134 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching134Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping19Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.