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Malware1 associated actor

Hodur

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK48Techniques
IOCs42Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Mustang Panda

“The KillSomeOne + Hodur variant has two categories of C&C servers for communication: the first one as a regular C&C server to receive backdoor commands, while the second one is designed to download payloads for process injection in svchost.exe.”

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

48 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

6 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

Mustang Panda has registered domains for use as download servers.

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

Some download servers used by Mustang Panda appear to be on shared hosting.

T1583.004ServerEvidence1

Mustang Panda uses servers that appear to be exclusive to the group.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence2

Earth Preta has been refining its tools for some time now, constantly adding new functionalities and features.

T1588.006VulnerabilitiesEvidence1

Multiple DLL hijacking vulnerabilities are used in the deployment process.

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

Malicious payloads are hosted on the download servers.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Thread 1: Worm behavior in USB drive (Lateral Movement)

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

notre analyse indique que les attaques de phishing et de watering hole sont des vecteurs probables.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Mustang Panda focuses on European diplomats, ISPs (Internet Service Providers), and research institutes, using phishing lures with decoy documents.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Les échantillons antérieurs y parvenaient en créant une tâche planifiée à exécuter au démarrage via schtasks.exe.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

...some indicative examples are commands to list drives and directories, read and write files, execute commands on a hidden desktop, and start an interactive remote cmd.exe session.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Mustang Panda uses CreateProcess and ShellExecute for execution.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Mustang Panda uses LoadLibrary to load additional DLLs at runtime. The loader and RAT are DLLs.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Mustang Panda relies on the user executing the initial downloader.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Les échantillons antérieurs y parvenaient en créant une tâche planifiée à exécuter au démarrage via schtasks.exe.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Korplug can create, modify, and remove registry keys.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Persistence is achieved by adding a new registry entry to “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Les échantillons antérieurs y parvenaient en créant une tâche planifiée à exécuter au démarrage via schtasks.exe.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Some versions of the Korplug loader inject the Korplug DLL into a newly launched process.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Persistence is achieved by adding a new registry entry to “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”

Stealth

13 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Korplug payloads are decrypted in memory, while only an encrypted form is ever written to the disk. Additionally, all strings are encrypted and Windows API function calls are obfuscated...

T1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsEvidence1

Imports are hidden by dynamic resolution of API function names.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

Scheduled tasks created for persistence use legitimate-looking names.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

File and directory names match expected values for the legitimate app that is abused by the loader.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Some versions of the Korplug loader inject the Korplug DLL into a newly launched process.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Korplug’s uninstall command deletes registry keys that store data and provide persistence.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Korplug can remove itself and all created directories.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

When writing to a file, Korplug sets the file’s timestamps to their previous values.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

Korplug payloads are decrypted in memory, while only an encrypted form is ever written to the disk.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

...now feature much heavier obfuscation and anti-analysis systems present across the entire infection chain... while anti-execution measures also exist.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

...the newly created directories that host the malware components are marked as “hidden” and “system.”

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

Korplug can run commands on a hidden desktop. Multiple hidden windows are used during the deployment process.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Korplug parses and loads itself into memory.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Korplug can create, modify, and remove registry keys.

T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

...some indicative examples are commands to list drives and directories, read and write files...

Discovery

8 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Korplug collects the system hostname and IP addresses.

T1016.001Internet Connection DiscoveryEvidence1

Cette commande ping vérifie la connectivité Internet

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Korplug obtains the current user’s username.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

GetSystemInfo – gather and send system information

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

...some indicative examples are commands to list drives and directories, read and write files...

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

Korplug uses GetSystemTime to retrieve the current system time.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

...now feature much heavier obfuscation and anti-analysis systems present across the entire infection chain... while anti-execution measures also exist.

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

Korplug retrieves the system locale using GetSystemDefaultLCID .

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Thread 1: Worm behavior in USB drive (Lateral Movement)

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Korplug collects extensive data about the system it’s running on.

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence1

Korplug can collect metadata and content from all mapped drives.

T1039Data from Network Shared DriveEvidence1

Korplug can collect metadata and content from all mapped drives.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

The Korplug configuration contains fallback C&C servers.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

La poignée de main initiale de Hodur peut se faire par HTTPS

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Les communications ultérieures se font toujours via TCP à l'aide d'un protocole personnalisé

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Korplug can download additional files from the C&C server.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

Korplug compresses transferred data using LZNT1.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

When Hodur performs its initial handshake over HTTPS, it uses the same port (specified in the configuration) as for the rest of the communication.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

C&C communication is encrypted using RC4.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Data exfiltration is done via the same custom protocol used to send and receive commands.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

42 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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trendai security blogNews · Jan 1, 2026Key Insights on SHADOW-AETHER-015 and Earth Preta from the 2025 MITRE ATT&CK Evaluation with TrendAI Vision One™PlugX variant mentioned in Earth Preta's 2020–2022 evolution toward more persistent espionage operations, alongside hardened command-and-control and multistage delivery.Read more ↗trendai security blogNews · Jan 1, 2026Earth Preta Campaign Uses DOPLUGS to Target Asia | TrendAI (US)Earlier customized PlugX variant in Earth Preta's tooling evolution. KillSomeOne-integrated Hodur samples were active approximately from September 2021 through December 2022. The analyzed variant separates command delivery and payload downloading across two categories of command-and-control servers. Transitional samples combine Hodur-era functionality with DOPLUGS-style customized commands.Read more ↗trend micro researchNews · Feb 20, 2024Earth Preta Campaign Uses DOPLUGS to Target Asia | Trend Micro (US)An earlier Earth Preta PlugX variant/generation referenced for lineage and evolution comparison with DOPLUGS.Read more ↗eset welivesecurity blogNews · Mar 25, 2022Mustang Panda’s Hodur: Old tricks, new Korplug variantNouvelle variante de Korplug/PlugX utilisée dans une campagne attribuée à Mustang Panda. Elle est déployée via un chargeur personnalisé et DLL side-loading, met en place une persistance via tâches planifiées ou clés Run, communique avec le C2 via HTTPS/TCP avec chiffrement RC4, et fournit des capacités complètes de RAT/backdoor incluant reconnaissance système, navigation de fichiers, lecture/écriture de fichiers, exécution de commandes et shell distant.Read more ↗
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IOC matching42Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping48Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.