Hodur
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“The KillSomeOne + Hodur variant has two categories of C&C servers for communication: the first one as a regular C&C server to receive backdoor commands, while the second one is designed to download payloads for process injection in svchost.exe.”
Techniques & procedures
48 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
6 techniques
Resource Development
Mustang Panda has registered domains for use as download servers.
Some download servers used by Mustang Panda appear to be on shared hosting.
Mustang Panda uses servers that appear to be exclusive to the group.
Earth Preta has been refining its tools for some time now, constantly adding new functionalities and features.
Multiple DLL hijacking vulnerabilities are used in the deployment process.
Malicious payloads are hosted on the download servers.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
Thread 1: Worm behavior in USB drive (Lateral Movement)
notre analyse indique que les attaques de phishing et de watering hole sont des vecteurs probables.
Mustang Panda focuses on European diplomats, ISPs (Internet Service Providers), and research institutes, using phishing lures with decoy documents.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
Les échantillons antérieurs y parvenaient en créant une tâche planifiée à exécuter au démarrage via schtasks.exe.
...some indicative examples are commands to list drives and directories, read and write files, execute commands on a hidden desktop, and start an interactive remote cmd.exe session.
Mustang Panda uses CreateProcess and ShellExecute for execution.
Mustang Panda uses LoadLibrary to load additional DLLs at runtime. The loader and RAT are DLLs.
Mustang Panda relies on the user executing the initial downloader.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
Les échantillons antérieurs y parvenaient en créant une tâche planifiée à exécuter au démarrage via schtasks.exe.
Korplug can create, modify, and remove registry keys.
Persistence is achieved by adding a new registry entry to “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Les échantillons antérieurs y parvenaient en créant une tâche planifiée à exécuter au démarrage via schtasks.exe.
Some versions of the Korplug loader inject the Korplug DLL into a newly launched process.
Persistence is achieved by adding a new registry entry to “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”
Stealth
13 techniques
Stealth
Korplug payloads are decrypted in memory, while only an encrypted form is ever written to the disk. Additionally, all strings are encrypted and Windows API function calls are obfuscated...
Imports are hidden by dynamic resolution of API function names.
Scheduled tasks created for persistence use legitimate-looking names.
File and directory names match expected values for the legitimate app that is abused by the loader.
Some versions of the Korplug loader inject the Korplug DLL into a newly launched process.
Korplug’s uninstall command deletes registry keys that store data and provide persistence.
Korplug can remove itself and all created directories.
When writing to a file, Korplug sets the file’s timestamps to their previous values.
Korplug payloads are decrypted in memory, while only an encrypted form is ever written to the disk.
...now feature much heavier obfuscation and anti-analysis systems present across the entire infection chain... while anti-execution measures also exist.
...the newly created directories that host the malware components are marked as “hidden” and “system.”
Korplug can run commands on a hidden desktop. Multiple hidden windows are used during the deployment process.
Korplug parses and loads itself into memory.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
Korplug can create, modify, and remove registry keys.
...some indicative examples are commands to list drives and directories, read and write files...
Discovery
8 techniques
Discovery
Korplug collects the system hostname and IP addresses.
Cette commande ping vérifie la connectivité Internet
Korplug obtains the current user’s username.
GetSystemInfo – gather and send system information
...some indicative examples are commands to list drives and directories, read and write files...
Korplug uses GetSystemTime to retrieve the current system time.
...now feature much heavier obfuscation and anti-analysis systems present across the entire infection chain... while anti-execution measures also exist.
Korplug retrieves the system locale using GetSystemDefaultLCID .
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Thread 1: Worm behavior in USB drive (Lateral Movement)
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
Korplug collects extensive data about the system it’s running on.
Korplug can collect metadata and content from all mapped drives.
Korplug can collect metadata and content from all mapped drives.
Command and Control
7 techniques
Command and Control
The Korplug configuration contains fallback C&C servers.
La poignée de main initiale de Hodur peut se faire par HTTPS
Les communications ultérieures se font toujours via TCP à l'aide d'un protocole personnalisé
Korplug can download additional files from the C&C server.
Korplug compresses transferred data using LZNT1.
When Hodur performs its initial handshake over HTTPS, it uses the same port (specified in the configuration) as for the rest of the communication.
C&C communication is encrypted using RC4.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Data exfiltration is done via the same custom protocol used to send and receive commands.
Observables
42 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.