Malware

Logedrut

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The primary infection vector is a spear phishing email with a malicious attachment.

Execution

1 technique

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Although we collected several document based exploit files (RTF, XLS, and PDF) in this attack campaign, most of the attachments were executable files that, interestingly, suggest a custom malware installer.

Discovery

1 technique

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The primary purpose of these families is to establish a bridgehead, collecting system information and downloading additional malware from a remote server.

Command and Control

4 techniques

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

one of the unique features of Elirks is that it retrieves a command and control (C2) address from a public-facing blog service.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

A sample of Logedrut was identified and is capable of communicating with C2 through an internal proxy server in the compromised organization.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The primary purpose of these families is to establish a bridgehead, collecting system information and downloading additional malware from a remote server.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

it retrieves a command and control (C2) address from a public-facing blog service

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

117 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

105 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

12 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

paloalto researchcenter historicNews

Sep 15, 2016

MILE TEA: Cyber Espionage Campaign Targets Asia Pacific Businesses and Government Agencies

Initial-stage malware in the MILE TEA campaign that establishes persistence/foothold, collects system information, and downloads additional malware. It can retrieve C2 addresses from public blog services, decoding them with Base64 and decrypting them with DES using the static key '1q2w3e4r'. One sample was specially crafted to communicate through an internal proxy at a Japanese trading company.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching117

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

Logedrut

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The primary infection vector is a spear phishing email with a malicious attachment.

Execution

1 technique

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Discovery

1 technique

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The primary purpose of these families is to establish a bridgehead, collecting system information and downloading additional malware from a remote server.

Command and Control

4 techniques

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

one of the unique features of Elirks is that it retrieves a command and control (C2) address from a public-facing blog service.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

A sample of Logedrut was identified and is capable of communicating with C2 through an internal proxy server in the compromised organization.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The primary purpose of these families is to establish a bridgehead, collecting system information and downloading additional malware from a remote server.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

it retrieves a command and control (C2) address from a public-facing blog service

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

117 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

105 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

12 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

paloalto researchcenter historicNews

Sep 15, 2016

MILE TEA: Cyber Espionage Campaign Targets Asia Pacific Businesses and Government Agencies

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching117

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.