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Malware1 associated actor

SloughRAT

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs23Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

SloughRAT is a Windows Script File-based remote access trojan associated with the Iranian state-linked threat cluster commonly tracked as MuddyWater and aligned with the Canopy implant name used by CISA. It was observed in campaigns from late 2021 into early 2022 targeting organizations in the Arabian Peninsula and Jordan, with broader MuddyWater activity also affecting Turkey, Pakistan, and Armenia. Reported victim sectors included government entities, ministries, universities, and telecommunications providers, consistent with espionage-oriented targeting.

SloughRAT is implemented as obfuscated Visual Basic and JavaScript code embedded in WSF format. It supports execution of arbitrary commands delivered from command-and-control infrastructure, typically by invoking the Windows command interpreter, collecting command output, and returning results to the operator. The malware also performs basic host discovery, including collection of system identity information used to register infected hosts with its controllers. Communications were observed over HTTP, with separate registration and tasking/result workflows and randomized beacon timing to reduce predictability.

Observed delivery involved phishing messages carrying malicious Excel documents with macros. In documented infection chains, the macro dropped two WSF components: an instrumentor script and the SloughRAT payload. The instrumentor executed the next stage and established persistence by placing itself in the current user Startup folder. In some related MuddyWater intrusions, operators also used scheduled tasks, additional Visual Basic and JavaScript downloaders, and post-compromise tooling such as Ligolo for reverse tunneling.

SloughRAT is best characterized as a script-based RAT used for command execution, host registration, persistence support through its companion script, and exfiltration of command results in support of MuddyWater’s espionage and broader intrusion operations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MuddyWater

Beginning in December 2021, we observed MuddyWater using a new WSF-based RAT we named "SloughRAT" to target countries in the Arabian Peninsula.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence4

These XLS files were observed targeting the Arabian peninsula through a recent phishing campaign.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

These campaigns primarily utilize malicious documents (maldocs) to deploy downloaders and RATs implemented in a variety of languages, such as PowerShell, Visual Basic and JavaScript.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The obfuscated Trojan also attempts to execute arbitrary code and commands received from its command and control servers... one written in Visual Basic during 2021-2022 and one written in JavaScript in 2019-2020, which also downloads and runs arbitrary commands on the victim's system.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

cmd.exe /c <path_to_WSF_RAT> <key>

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

The maldoc consists of a malicious macro that drops two WSF files on the endpoint.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

This RAT consists of obfuscated code from interweaved Visual Basic and JavaScript... one written in JavaScript in 2019-2020, which also downloads and runs arbitrary commands on the victim's system. | One of these scripts is the instrumentor script meant to execute the next stage... The second script is a WSF-based RAT we call 'SloughRAT' that can execute arbitrary commands on the infected endpoint.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

The maldoc, an Excel file containing a malicious macro, triggers the infection chain to drop two Windows Script Files (.WSF) on the endpoint

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

This instrumentor script is placed in the current user's Startup folder by the VBA macro to establish persistence across reboots.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

This instrumentor script is placed in the current user's Startup folder by the VBA macro to establish persistence across reboots.

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

This trojan, although obfuscated, is relatively simple...

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The RAT script begins execution by performing a WMI query to record the IP address of the infected endpoint.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

It will then get the user and computer names by querying the environment variables

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It will then get the user and computer names by querying the environment variables

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

MuddyWater also relies heavily on the use of DNS to contact their C2 servers, while the initial contact with the hosting servers is conducted via HTTP.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The communication with the C2 is done using the common ServerXMLHTTP from the MSXML2 API to instrument an HTTP POST request.

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

MuddyWater also relies heavily on the use of DNS to contact their C2 servers

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The attackers utilized SloughRAT to deploy Ligolo, an open-source reverse-tunneling tool

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

living-off-the-land binaries (LoLBins) and remote connection utilities to assist in the initial stages of the infection

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The output of the command would be written to a temporary file in the %APPDATA% directory and subsequently read and exfiltrated to the C2.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

23 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching23Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.