Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware

Lightning Stealer

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Execution T1204 User Execution

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

The Lightning stealer steals the Discord token from the following directory: “discord\Local Storage\leveldb”

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

Then malware steals the cookies data from moz_cookies table in “cookies.sqlite” file... Then malware steals cookies from cookies table present “Cookies” file

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... T1552 Unsecured Credentials

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Lightning Stealer checks this directory along with the file names mentioned below: key4.db... logins.json... It first steals the data from the login.json file and looks for mozglue.dll and nss3.dll, which will be used to decrypt the “login.json” file.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... T1007 System Service Discovery

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware then proceeds to steal the victim’s system info. Figure 14 shows the system info gathered by malware. MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... T1124 System Time Discovery

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

It initially identifies the Firefox-based browsers present in a system... those paths will be added to a new list for stealing data... After stealing data from Firefox-based browsers, the malware targets Chromium-based browsers.

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

After this, the malware takes a screenshot of the victim’s screen and saves it in the “AppData\Roaming\” folder named “1.png”.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

After this, the malware exfiltrates the data to the following domain: hxxp[:]//panelss[.]xyz/Stealer/TSave The body of the request is sent in JSON format

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Then it creates a file named “444.txt”... converts the stolen data into JSON strings... After this, the malware exfiltrates the data to the following domain: hxxp[:]//panelss[.]xyz/Stealer/TSave

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.