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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Elirks

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs178Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2011-0611via palo alto networks unit 42 blogExploited in the wildAdobe Flash type confusion leading to remote code executionWhen a user opened the attached PDF file, the following message is displayed. It exploits a vulnerability in Adobe Flash, CVE-2011-0611 embedded in the PDF and installs Elirks malware on the system. | Elirks, less widely known than PlugX, is a basic backdoor Trojan, first discovered in 2010, that is primarily used to steal information from compromised systems.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Scarlet Mimic

Elirks, less widely known than PlugX, is a basic backdoor Trojan, first discovered in 2010, that is primarily used to steal information from compromised systems.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

The primary infection vector is a spear phishing email with a malicious attachment.

Execution

3 techniques
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

It exploits a vulnerability in Adobe Flash, CVE-2011-0611 embedded in the PDF and installs Elirks malware on the system.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

When a user opened the attached PDF file, the following message is displayed.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Although we collected several document based exploit files (RTF, XLS, and PDF) in this attack campaign, most of the attachments were executable files that, interestingly, suggest a custom malware installer.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

2012 2016 Email Sender Masquerades as an existing bank in Taiwan Masquerade as an existing aviation company in Japan

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The primary purpose of these families is to establish a bridgehead, collecting system information and downloading additional malware from a remote server.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

When opening the file, Elirks executes itself on the computer and creates ticket.doc to deceive users

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

one of the unique features of Elirks is that it retrieves a command and control (C2) address from a public-facing blog service.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The primary purpose of these families is to establish a bridgehead, collecting system information and downloading additional malware from a remote server.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

Attackers create accounts on those services and post encoded IP addresses or the domain names of real C2 servers in advance of distributing the backdoor.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

178 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching178Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.