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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

NotSoTinyTurla

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

The resulting investigation led Sophos MDR Ops analysts and SophosLabs researchers to uncover a backdoor leveraging a loading function similar to that previously seen within the TinyTurla backdoor.

via infosecinfosec.exchange
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

the threat actors in this case modified the registry entry for the legitimate smphost service DLL to point to the malicious smpsvc.dll carrying the backdoor.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The registry entry for the ‘smphost’ service was set with a value of ‘2’ for autostart, allowing the backdoor to auto-execute without threat actor interaction.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The final payload downloaded is injected into process memory and applies API call obfuscation to further avoid detection.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The registry entry for the ‘smphost’ service was set with a value of ‘2’ for autostart, allowing the backdoor to auto-execute without threat actor interaction.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The smphost.dat we saw contains heavily obfuscated data, lacks a PE header and section names... The C2 domain ... is XOR encoded (0x83)... The final payload downloaded is injected into process memory and applies API call obfuscation to further avoid detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Evidence indicates the backdoor had been present in the environment since at least June 2022, as a DLL masquerading as a legitimate SMP host service (smpsvc.dll).

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The final payload downloaded is injected into process memory and applies API call obfuscation to further avoid detection.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

the threat actors in this case modified the registry entry for the legitimate smphost service DLL to point to the malicious smpsvc.dll carrying the backdoor.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The C2 domain, hxxps[://]cache[.]chartbaet[.]com/static/cache/, is XOR encoded... leverages the user agent [Mozilla/5.0 ... Chrome/93.0.4577.63 Safari/537.36].

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.