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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

MegaCreep

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK19Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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POLONIUM

MegaCreep is a previously undocumented backdoor based on DeepCreep, with added functionalities. It reads and executes commands from a text file stored in Mega cloud storage.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

POLONIUM has developed at least six backdoors and several other malicious modules.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep and FlipCreep create scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep, FlipCreep and TechnoCreep use cmd.exe to execute commands in a compromised computer.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

DeepCreep and MegaCreep have their code divided into small DLLs, which are loaded both statically and dynamically.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep and FlipCreep create scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

DeepCreep persists by creating a LNK file in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep and FlipCreep create scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

DeepCreep persists by creating a LNK file in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

POLONIUM has used filenames such as Mega.exe or DropBox.exe for its backdoors, to make them look like legitimate binaries.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

DeepCreep and MegaDeep use AES encryption to obfuscate commands and login credentials stored in local files on the victim’s computer.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

POLONIUM has executed whoami.exe to identify the logged-on user.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep and FlipCreep look for running processes and kill other instances of themselves.

Collection

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

T1560.002Archive via LibraryEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep and FlipCreep use .NET’s ZipFile class to archive collected data.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Some backdoors abuse legitimate cloud services, such as OneDrive, Dropbox, and Mega, to act as command and control (C2) servers. Other backdoors utilize standard TCP connections to remote C2 servers or get commands to execute from files hosted on FTP servers.

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

POLONIUM has used cloud platforms such as OneDrive, Dropbox, and Mega to send commands and store the output.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

DeepCreep and MegaCreep AES encrypt commands and their output.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

DeepCreep, MegaCreep, FlipCreep and TechnoCreep exfiltrate files over the C&C channel via upload commands.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

POLONIUM has used OneDrive, Dropbox, and Mega cloud storage to store stolen information.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping19Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.