Malware

LockPoS

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Технику применяют сл.вредоносы - все они мапят свои либы с атрибутом SEC_IMAGE для загрузки пайлоада

Persistence

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

LockPoS uses the regular “registry run” method for persistence.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

В данной статье мы рассмотрим более продвинутый подход к инжекту - в его основе лежит вполне легальный механизм проецирования секций памяти "Mapping"...

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Технику применяют сл.вредоносы - все они мапят свои либы с атрибутом SEC_IMAGE для загрузки пайлоада

T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence1

Данный метод незаслуженно остаётся в тени упомянутого выше. В его основе лежит NtMapViewOfSection() из либы Ntdll.dll, которая используется малварью для скрытой инъекции кода в обход EDR. Технику применяют сл.вредоносы - все они мапят свои либы с атрибутом SEC_IMAGE для загрузки пайлоада

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

LockPoS uses the regular “registry run” method for persistence.

Stealth

4 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

It starts out by resolving several Windows functions using API hashing... Extracting a resource named “CORE” Decrypting it using AES-256 in CBC mode... Decompressing the plaintext... It obfuscates important strings using XOR and a key of “A”.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Технику применяют сл.вредоносы - все они мапят свои либы с атрибутом SEC_IMAGE для загрузки пайлоада

T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence1

Discovery

2 techniques

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware’s PoS credit card stealing functionality works similarly to other PoS malware: it scans the memory of other running programs looking for data that matches what credit card track data looks like

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

there is one data chunk that contains the following nine entries: ... username, computer name, and bot ID ... CPU ... Physical memory ... Display devices ... Windows version and architecture ... MD5 hash of currently running sample

Collection

1 technique

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

it scans the memory of other running programs looking for data that matches what credit card track data looks like

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

C2 communications are via HTTP and using a very telling User-Agent. An example request looks like: The POST data is a structure consisting of “data chunks”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

LockPoS supports the following commands: Update config Download and execute Rotate data file Update self Inject executable file into explorer.exe

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Using some example credit card track two data... here is an example credit card exfiltration by LockPoS... The second data chunk consists of... Credit card track data and application it came from

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

codebyNews

Aug 19, 2026

Внедрение кода через проекцию NtMapViewOfSection

Referenced as a banking trojan that uses NtMapViewOfSection/section mapping for stealthier payload loading or injection.

arbor networksNews

Aug 14, 2026

LockPoS Joins the Flock | NETSCOUT

Point-of-sale malware that persists via a registry Run key, communicates with its C2 over HTTP, can update config/self, download and execute payloads, inject into explorer.exe, and steals payment card track data by scraping process memory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

LockPoS

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Технику применяют сл.вредоносы - все они мапят свои либы с атрибутом SEC_IMAGE для загрузки пайлоада

Persistence

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

LockPoS uses the regular “registry run” method for persistence.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Технику применяют сл.вредоносы - все они мапят свои либы с атрибутом SEC_IMAGE для загрузки пайлоада

T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence1

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

LockPoS uses the regular “registry run” method for persistence.

Stealth

4 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Технику применяют сл.вредоносы - все они мапят свои либы с атрибутом SEC_IMAGE для загрузки пайлоада

T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence1

Discovery

2 techniques

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Collection

1 technique

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

it scans the memory of other running programs looking for data that matches what credit card track data looks like

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

C2 communications are via HTTP and using a very telling User-Agent. An example request looks like: The POST data is a structure consisting of “data chunks”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

LockPoS supports the following commands: Update config Download and execute Rotate data file Update self Inject executable file into explorer.exe

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Using some example credit card track two data... here is an example credit card exfiltration by LockPoS... The second data chunk consists of... Credit card track data and application it came from

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

codebyNews

Aug 19, 2026

Внедрение кода через проекцию NtMapViewOfSection

Referenced as a banking trojan that uses NtMapViewOfSection/section mapping for stealthier payload loading or injection.

arbor networksNews

Aug 14, 2026

LockPoS Joins the Flock | NETSCOUT

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.