Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

PapaCreep

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
POLONIUM

PapaCreep is a previously undocumented custom backdoor written in C++ that can receive and execute commands from a remote server via TCP sockets.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

POLONIUM has acquired various servers for C&C and also for storing exfiltrated files.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

POLONIUM has developed at least six backdoors and several other malicious modules.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The advantage is that the components can run independently, persist via separate scheduled tasks in the breached system, and make the backdoor harder to detect.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep and FlipCreep create scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep, FlipCreep and TechnoCreep use cmd.exe to execute commands in a compromised computer.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

DeepCreep and MegaCreep have their code divided into small DLLs, which are loaded both statically and dynamically.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The advantage is that the components can run independently, persist via separate scheduled tasks in the breached system, and make the backdoor harder to detect.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep and FlipCreep create scheduled tasks for persistence.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The advantage is that the components can run independently, persist via separate scheduled tasks in the breached system, and make the backdoor harder to detect.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

DeepCreep, MegaCreep and FlipCreep create scheduled tasks for persistence.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

Discovery

1 technique
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

POLONIUM has executed whoami.exe to identify the logged-on user.

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Some backdoors abuse legitimate cloud services, such as OneDrive, Dropbox, and Mega, to act as command and control (C2) servers. Other backdoors utilize standard TCP connections to remote C2 servers or get commands to execute from files hosted on FTP servers.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

TechnoCreep and POLONIUM’s reverse shell module use TCP.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

their malicious activity includes the ability to log keystrokes, take screenshots of the desktop, take photos with the webcam, exfiltrate files from the host, install additional malware, and execute commands on the infected device.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

CreepySnail, CreepyDrive and some of POLONIUM’s reverse shell modules use base64-encoded commands to communicate with the C&C server.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

DeepCreep, MegaCreep, FlipCreep and TechnoCreep exfiltrate files over the C&C channel via upload commands.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.