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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Groups of OpenSUpdater samples are often signed with the same code-signing certificate, obtained from a legitimate certificate authority. | Since mid-August, OpenSUpdater samples have carried an invalid signature, and further investigation showed this was a deliberate attempt to evade detection.
22 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A family of unwanted software used to download and install other suspicious programs. The actor behind it appears focused on broad infection volume rather than precise targeting, with many victims in the United States, and has used deliberately malformed code signatures on Windows PE files to evade detection while still appearing valid to Windows.
Adware application used as the malicious payload signed with fraudulently obtained code-signing certificates; it can install unwanted software on the victim machine.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.