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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
As a result of studying a sample that was thought to have been used by Lazarus (bfcsvc.dll), we found multiple similarities with msoRAT and the credential stealer.
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Lazarus-linked sample cited for strong code and behavior overlap with msoRAT and the credential stealer, including similar packing, function-call obfuscation, access to msomain.sdb, and Security Packages-related functionality.
A Lazarus-linked sample cited for strong code and behavior overlap with msoRAT and the credential stealer, including similar packing, function-call obfuscation, access to msomain.sdb, and Security Packages-related functionality.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.