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Mallory
Malware

CollectorGoomba

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs40Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

1 technique
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After the stolen data is exfiltrated, the spyware deletes the temporary files it created, frees the memory it used, and finishes executing.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The spyware reads sensitive data from the user’s web browser including their web cookies, personal information, and even login details

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The spyware reads sensitive data from the user’s web browser including their web cookies, personal information, and even login details (frequently stored in the web browser’s autofill feature). Specifically, the spyware targets the data files of Google Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer.

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Finally, the sample takes a screenshot of the victim’s desktop and adds all of the stolen information to a zip archive.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Finally, the sample takes a screenshot of the victim’s desktop and adds all of the stolen information to a zip archive.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The code calls high-level networking functions HttpSendRequest() and InternetWriteFile() to send an HTTP POST to u667503srd[.]ha004[.]t[.]justns[.]ru/collect[.]php.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

CollectorGoomba makes use of high-level networking features to retrieve a text file that contains the domain of the collection server... the function InternetReadFile(), which attempts to read a text file hosted in a publicly available GitHub repository.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The received text file contains the details of the spyware-as-a-service domain where the sample is instructed to upload the victim’s stolen information... Shortly after the sample was run, the developer... updated the text file in GitHub so that communicating spyware infections will receive ... the new C2 domain

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

When the spyware acquires its target domain, it exfiltrates the zip archive that contains all of the stolen data... to send an HTTP POST to u667503srd[.]ha004[.]t[.]justns[.]ru/collect[.]php.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

40 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching40Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.