Malware

CollectorGoomba

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

1 technique

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After the stolen data is exfiltrated, the spyware deletes the temporary files it created, frees the memory it used, and finishes executing.

Credential Access

2 techniques

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The spyware reads sensitive data from the user’s web browser including their web cookies, personal information, and even login details

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The spyware reads sensitive data from the user’s web browser including their web cookies, personal information, and even login details (frequently stored in the web browser’s autofill feature). Specifically, the spyware targets the data files of Google Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer.

Collection

2 techniques

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Finally, the sample takes a screenshot of the victim’s desktop and adds all of the stolen information to a zip archive.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Finally, the sample takes a screenshot of the victim’s desktop and adds all of the stolen information to a zip archive.

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The code calls high-level networking functions HttpSendRequest() and InternetWriteFile() to send an HTTP POST to u667503srd[.]ha004[.]t[.]justns[.]ru/collect[.]php.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

CollectorGoomba makes use of high-level networking features to retrieve a text file that contains the domain of the collection server... the function InternetReadFile(), which attempts to read a text file hosted in a publicly available GitHub repository.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The received text file contains the details of the spyware-as-a-service domain where the sample is instructed to upload the victim’s stolen information... Shortly after the sample was run, the developer... updated the text file in GitHub so that communicating spyware infections will receive ... the new C2 domain

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

When the spyware acquires its target domain, it exfiltrates the zip archive that contains all of the stolen data... to send an HTTP POST to u667503srd[.]ha004[.]t[.]justns[.]ru/collect[.]php.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

40 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

9 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

31 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

vmray blogNews

Jul 1, 2020

Cutting-off the Command-and-Control Infrastructure of CollectorGoomba | Threat Bulletin | VMRay

Spyware-as-a-service credential stealer that harvests browser cookies, personal information, autofill data, and login credentials from browsers including Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer; also targets apps such as Authy, FileZilla, Steam, Discord, and Pidgin, takes a desktop screenshot, archives stolen data, and exfiltrates it via HTTP POST to its C2 infrastructure.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching40

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

CollectorGoomba

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

1 technique

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After the stolen data is exfiltrated, the spyware deletes the temporary files it created, frees the memory it used, and finishes executing.

Credential Access

2 techniques

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The spyware reads sensitive data from the user’s web browser including their web cookies, personal information, and even login details

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Collection

2 techniques

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Finally, the sample takes a screenshot of the victim’s desktop and adds all of the stolen information to a zip archive.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Finally, the sample takes a screenshot of the victim’s desktop and adds all of the stolen information to a zip archive.

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The code calls high-level networking functions HttpSendRequest() and InternetWriteFile() to send an HTTP POST to u667503srd[.]ha004[.]t[.]justns[.]ru/collect[.]php.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

When the spyware acquires its target domain, it exfiltrates the zip archive that contains all of the stolen data... to send an HTTP POST to u667503srd[.]ha004[.]t[.]justns[.]ru/collect[.]php.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

40 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

9 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

31 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

vmray blogNews

Jul 1, 2020

Cutting-off the Command-and-Control Infrastructure of CollectorGoomba | Threat Bulletin | VMRay

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching40

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.