Malware

Korpze

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These leaked credentials are the default credentials of many poorly secured IoT devices.

Persistence

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These leaked credentials are the default credentials of many poorly secured IoT devices.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These leaked credentials are the default credentials of many poorly secured IoT devices.

Stealth

2 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

There are 60 hardcoded User-Agents included in the sample, which are used in the DoS module ovhl7 , SendHTTP, and SendHTTPCloudflare . Once the DoS module is launched at a target, the function randomly chooses a User-Agents to attack with.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These leaked credentials are the default credentials of many poorly secured IoT devices.

Credential Access

1 technique

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

The function telnet_scanner_init is in charge of setting the initial foothold in vulnerable devices. It scans randomly generated IPs and tries to log in with a list of pre-defined, hardcoded credentials on port 23 (Telnet).

Discovery

1 technique

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

It scans randomly generated IPs and tries to log in with a list of pre-defined, hardcoded credentials on port 23 (Telnet).

Impact

3 techniques

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

There is a specific function called UpdateNameSrvs to change nameservers on the infected device. The function is responsible for writing the file /etc/resolv.conf with Google’s DNS servers.

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

we have investigated the sample and discovered that a Gafgyt fork has been updated and it is now being distributed with two new Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) modules to launch attacks against targeted machines. | sendTCP TCP DoS attack with random TCP packet parameters ... UDPBYPASS UDP DoS flood with hardcoded hex bytes ... UDPRAW UDP DoS flood with raw copied bytes ... The wabbajack function uses socket_connect_icmp to launch an ICMP flood at the target.

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence1

sendHTTP HTTP DoS server resource exhaustion attack

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

cujo blogNews

Sep 7, 2021

Threat Alert: Mirai/Gafgyt Fork with New DDoS Modules Discovered - CUJO AI

An IoT botnet malware sample described as a Gafgyt fork with Mirai/Gafgyt lineage. It gains initial access by scanning random IPs and attempting Telnet logins with hardcoded default credentials, then uses multiple DDoS modules including HTTP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, Valve Source Engine, Cloudflare-targeting, and newly observed OpenVPN- and ICMP-flood related attack vectors. It also modifies /etc/resolv.conf to use Google DNS servers.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

Korpze

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These leaked credentials are the default credentials of many poorly secured IoT devices.

Persistence

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These leaked credentials are the default credentials of many poorly secured IoT devices.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These leaked credentials are the default credentials of many poorly secured IoT devices.

Stealth

2 techniques

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These leaked credentials are the default credentials of many poorly secured IoT devices.

Credential Access

1 technique

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Discovery

1 technique

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

It scans randomly generated IPs and tries to log in with a list of pre-defined, hardcoded credentials on port 23 (Telnet).

Impact

3 techniques

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

There is a specific function called UpdateNameSrvs to change nameservers on the infected device. The function is responsible for writing the file /etc/resolv.conf with Google’s DNS servers.

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence1

sendHTTP HTTP DoS server resource exhaustion attack

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

cujo blogNews

Sep 7, 2021

Threat Alert: Mirai/Gafgyt Fork with New DDoS Modules Discovered - CUJO AI

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.