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Malware1 associated actor

FRESHFIRE

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT29

Volexity has encountered a secondary DLL payload downloaded by the attacker after successful infection with CobaltStrike. This malware family, which Volexity has named “FRESHFIRE”, uses specific attributes on the infected hostname to decrypt and execute data received from a remote C2 server.

via volexity blogvolexity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The campaign’s phishing e-mails purported to originate from the USAID government agency and contained a malicious link that resulted in an ISO file being delivered.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Then, the data is executed in a separate thread, and an HTTP DELETE request is sent to the Firebase storage address used to download the payload.

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

The malware begins by attempting to open a mutex with the name “UlswcXJJWhtHIHrVqWJJ”. If this mutex already exists on the system the malware will exit, otherwise it will proceed.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The malware then queries the file attributes of the file “C:\dell.sdr” and appends data from these file attributes to the above mutex name. This combined string is then hashed with MD5 and used to generate a Triple DES decryption key.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The malware then queries the file attributes of the file “C:\dell.sdr” and appends data from these file attributes to the above mutex name. This combined string is then hashed with MD5 and used to generate a Triple DES decryption key.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The sample then uploads a timestamp to Firebase and downloads a blob from Firebase storage. This data is base64 decoded and decrypted using the generated key. Then, the data is executed in a separate thread...

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

This data is base64 decoded and decrypted using the generated key.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

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No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.