Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

SquirtDanger

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
TheBottle

we began by investigating a new malware family, which we are calling SquirtDanger based on a DLL, SquirtDanger.dll, used in the attacks.

via paloalto researchcenter historicresearchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Additionally, in the wild, we were able to identify 52 unique IP's or domains acting as delivery infrastructure. This infrastructure acts as a dissemination point for this malware. Some of this delivery infrastructure appeared to be compromised legitimate websites unwittingly distributing SquirtDanger.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

SquirtDanger is likely delivered via illicit software downloads also known as "Warez".

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Once run on the system, it will persist via a scheduled task that is set to run every minute.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The malware is written in C# (C Sharp) and has multiple layers of embedded code.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

SquirtDanger is likely delivered via illicit software downloads also known as "Warez".

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Once run on the system, it will persist via a scheduled task that is set to run every minute.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

This simple executable will simply check for the existence of the SquirtDanger payload, and if the payload cannot be found, a new copy is written to disk and a new instance will be spawned.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Once run on the system, it will persist via a scheduled task that is set to run every minute.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

This simple executable will simply check for the existence of the SquirtDanger payload, and if the payload cannot be found, a new copy is written to disk and a new instance will be spawned.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

This executable is embedded within the SquirtDanger payload, and has been observed dropped to the following location: %TEMP%\MSBuild.exe

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Once the installation phase has completed and the malware is found to be executed from the correct location, a new mutex will be created to ensure only one instance of the malware is run at a given time.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

This dropped file is given both SYSTEM and HIDDEN attributes to prevent victims from discovering it.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

In the case of stealing passwords from browsers, a number of browsers are supported, including the following: Chrome Firefox Yandex Browser Kometa Amigo Torch Opera

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

SquirtDanger comes with a wealth of functionality, including the following: ... List processes

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

SquirtDanger comes with a wealth of functionality, including the following: ... List drives Get directory information

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Once the installation phase has completed and the malware is found to be executed from the correct location, a new mutex will be created to ensure only one instance of the malware is run at a given time.

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

SquirtDanger comes with a wealth of functionality, including the following: Take screenshots

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

In addition to stealing wallets, the malware contains the ability to swap a victim’s clipboard data in the event a specific regular expression is encountered.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

SquirtDanger uses raw TCP connections to a remote command and control (C2) server for network communications.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

When the malware initially communicates with the remote server, it will attempt to obtain a list of additional modules to install... After the list of modules and their associated URLs are collected, SquirtDanger will download these modules via HTTP communication.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

SquirtDanger uses raw TCP connections to a remote command and control (C2) server for network communications.

Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.