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Malware1 associated actor

TurlaPower-NG

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

We’ve also discovered previously unknown PowerShell scripts we’re calling “TurlaPower-NG '' that are meant to act as file exfiltrators. TinyTurla-NG deployed these scripts to exfiltrate key material used to secure the password databases of popular password management software, indicating a concerted effort for Turla to steal login credentials.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The tasks can be executed either using a PowerShell or command (cmd.exe) shell... while executing commands via PowerShell.exe, TinyTurla-NG will additionally execute the following PowerShell cmdlet to prevent the recording of command history: Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

TinyTurla-NG deployed these scripts to exfiltrate key material used to secure the password databases of popular password management software, indicating a concerted effort for Turla to steal login credentials.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

For each file path specified, the script will recursively enumerate files and add them to an archive on disk.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

For each file path specified, the script will recursively enumerate files and add them to an archive on disk.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

In this campaign, Turla uses compromised WordPress-based websites as command and control endpoints (C2) for the TTNG backdoor.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The archive file is then exfiltrated to the C2 using HTTP/S POST requests along with a log of the activity performed being sent to the C2 as well.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.