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Mallory
Malware

BloodyStealer

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

the majority of the BloodyStealer samples were protected with a commercial solution named “AgileNet” ... protected not only with AgileNet but also with other, very popular, protection tools for the .NET environment, such as Confuser.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

we were able to identify several anti-analysis methods that were used to complicate reverse engineering and analysis of BloodyStealer, including the usage of packers and anti-debugging techniques.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

According to the ad, BloodyStealer was a malicious stealer capable of fetching session data and passwords, and cookie exfiltration.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

According to the ad, BloodyStealer was a malicious stealer capable of fetching session data and passwords, and cookie exfiltration.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

BloodyStealer is capable of assigning a unique identifier to every infected victim. The identifier is created by extracting data, such as the GUID and serial number (SID) of the system.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

we were able to identify several anti-analysis methods that were used to complicate reverse engineering and analysis of BloodyStealer, including the usage of packers and anti-debugging techniques.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Steals files from the desktop (.txt) and the uTorrent client

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Stealer for all information about the PC and screenshots

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The data itself is sent to the configured C&C server later as a non-protected ZIP archive

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

After assigning a UID to the victim and getting the C&C IP address, BloodyStealer extracts various data from the infected machine, creates a POST request with information about the exfiltrated data, and sends it to the malicious C&C.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The data itself is sent to the configured C&C server later as a non-protected ZIP archive

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.