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Malware1 associated actor

Infy

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs125Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Prince of Persia

Malware Lineage Infy (2007) ──► Foudre (2016) ──► Tonnerre (2020) ──► Tornado (2026)

via sh3llc0d3 blogsh3llc0d3.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The attacks we have identified carrying Infy begin with a spear-phishing e-mail carrying a Word or PowerPoint document.

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The user sees a PowerPoint page that mimics a paused movie, and is tricked into clicking “Run”, which allows the embedded SFX file to execute.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The executable installs the DLL, writes to the autorun registry key, and doesn’t activate until a reboot.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The executable installs the DLL, writes to the autorun registry key, and doesn’t activate until a reboot.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The package typically includes a fake readme.txt file as camouflage... impersonating an Aptana Studio application... Each variant of Infy uses specific “cover” camouflage to with file metadata that makes it appear as though it is legitimate software.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

It starts collecting environment data, initiates a keylogger...

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

It starts collecting environment data, initiates a keylogger, and steals browser passwords and content such as cookies...

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Get_browser_data steals passwords, forms, cookies, history (from Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Opera, and Firefox).

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

After reboot, it first checks for antivirus and then connects to the C2. It starts collecting environment data...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

It will then search for files with “bak”, “csv”, or “cnt”, extensions.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

The initial executable first checks for installed antivirus programs. It uses the Windows API function “GetFileattributeA” on a list of several common AV installation directories...

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

It starts collecting environment data, initiates a keylogger...

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

It next registers hotkeys, and gets clipboard data.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The malware connects to the C2 every five minutes using HTTP, posting...

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After posting data about the infected system to the C2 server, the malware downloaded an update named “v30nXf1.tmp” file to %temp%\drvtem64.tmp.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

A third connection adds “sfolder”, “subject”, and this time exfiltrates data in the “body=” parameter.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

125 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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sh3llc0d3 blogNews · Oct 25, 2026Semperis Exposes Iranian APT Prince of Persia: R | ShellcodeIdentified as the earliest generation in Prince of Persia's proprietary malware lineage, dating to 2007. The content does not describe this generation's individual capabilities. Infy is also used separately as an alias for the threat actor.Read more ↗semperis blogNews · Oct 22, 2026Prince of Persia: A Threat Group Hiding in Plain Sight | Semperis ResearchPrince of Persia’s foundational espionage malware, discussed as historical background. Its Infy M variant supports HTTP/FTP communications, a hidden control interface, and remote command execution through backend scripts. A 2016 takedown disrupted the actor’s access to most infected victims.Read more ↗checkpoint research blogNews · Feb 8, 2021After Lightning Comes Thunder - Check Point ResearchLong-running Iranian-attributed malware family/operation active since at least 2007. The report describes renewed activity, improved OPSEC, and evolution into newer tooling including Foudre and Tonnerre.Read more ↗paloalto researchcenter historicNews · May 2, 2016Prince of Persia: Infy Malware Active In Decade of Targeted AttacksA long-running espionage malware family delivered via spear-phishing documents containing multi-layer SFX archives. It installs persistence via autorun, checks for antivirus, connects to C2, collects environment data, logs keystrokes, steals browser passwords/cookies/forms/history, and exfiltrates data. The parallel 'Infy M' variant adds fuller remote-control capability including HTTP-based command execution, remote shell, file upload/download, screen capture, document capture and upload, and microphone capture.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching125Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.